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A Note of Thanks

Listed below are the persons who reviewed manuscripts for the *CJE* from 1990 August to 1991 July. The editors thank these reviewers for performing their important function in the publication of our *Journal*.

Un mot de remerciements

On trouvera ci-dessous la liste des noms des arbitres des manuscrits proposés à la *RCE*, du mois d'août 1990 au mois de juillet 1991. Les rédacteurs expriment leurs remerciements à ces arbitres pour leur précieuse et indispensable collaboration à la publication de notre *Revue*.

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La “teste bien faite”: à réinventer¹

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Au cours des dernières années, la recherche sur la formation fondamentale a renouvelé le sens et la pertinence de l’expression “former des têtes bien faites.” S’il est pourtant un domaine où l’effort de retrouver le fondamental prend une singulière importance, c’est bien celui-là même auquel songeait Montaigne, c’est-à-dire l’éducation de l’éducateur. Cet article a pour but d’apporter quelques éléments de réflexion autour de la question de la formation fondamentale des enseignants. D’abord, en montrant que, dans la mesure où les programmes de formation initiale et de formation continue négligent le savoir et la réflexion sur les fins pour se préoccuper d’élaborer des savoir-faire ou des moyens, on ne saurait former des têtes bien faites. Ensuite, en proposant que les programmes de formation des maîtres ont besoin d’une base philosophique. C’est ce fondement qui permettrait de repenser l’essentiel, c’est-à-dire, d’abord qui est l’humain à éduquer; ensuite, ce qu’est éduquer en vue de l’avènement de l’humain; enfin, ce qu’est éduquer pour qui a choisi d’enseigner.

Studies of general education have lately given new life to the debate on how best to educate critical thinkers. It needs a particular sort of teacher to do this work, and thus a particular form of teacher preparation. Pre-service and in-service teacher education that emphasizes know-how and technique at the expense of an examination of final purposes may not produce critical thinkers. Teacher education programs should therefore be offered on a philosophical base emphasizing the humane aspect of education. Such programs would encourage redefinition of what it is to be human, and how best to educate to that end.

Celui qui, avec assurance, avait mis en place ce qu’il considérait les notions essentielles “à toute métaphysique future” insiste sur le fait qu’à propos de l’éducation, il ne présente que des réflexions (Kant, 1776/1786/1966, p. 9) et cela, au terme de sa carrière. Non pas, comme on pourrait peut-être le supposer, que le sujet soit indigne de retenir l’attention du philosophe. Bien au contraire, Kant écrit: “L’éducation est le plus grand et le plus difficile problème qui puisse être proposé à l’homme” (1776/1786/1966, p. 77). Au cours de la dernière décennie, ceux qui ont abordé ce problème se sont trouvés face à la tâche de retrouver, dans la masse des connaissances valables, désirables et accessibles, ce qui serait fondamental (Andrew et Esbensen, 1989; Gadbois, 1988a; Gingras, 1985, 1989; Laliberté, 1984, 1987; Robert, Bujold, Doyle, Lafrenière et Ryan, 1989).

Cet article poursuit un double objectif et s'attaque, de ce fait, à une double difficulté: d'abord apporter quelques éléments à la réflexion actuelle sur la formation fondamentale. Gadbois (1988a) identifie, comme première étape de cette recherche sur l'essentiel des savoirs, celle qui "pourrait consister à expliquer le sens . . . [de] l'épithète "essentiel" (p. 210). Or l'essentiel est justement "ce au sujet de quoi, en tous domaines, on fait silence," écrit Guitton (1989, p. 9). Il est donc peu rassurant, pour qui entend s'intéresser aux questions de fond, de lire, sous la plume de ce penseur: "J'aborde un sujet difficile: l'essentiel" (1989, p. 9). Le deuxième objet et le second défi de cet article est d'aborder l'essentiel de l'éducation des éducateurs. Car c'est à eux, et non pas aux élèves que pense Montaigne quand il écrit: "Je voudrais . . . qu'on fût soigneux de luy choisir un conducteur qui eust la teste plutost bien faicte que bien pleine" (1580/1927, p. 213). En reconnaissant que l'excellence en éducation dépend de l'excellence de la formation des enseignants, la recherche sur la formation fondamentale ne fait que rejoindre et confirmer une évidence de l'expérience commune. Il n'est personne qui reste indifférent au phénomène que Legendre nomme "l'information des maîtres" (1981, p. 151).

L'importance et la difficulté de la question portent à chercher la perspective la plus apte à favoriser la réflexion. Pour la trouver, rien de tel que de retourner au premier modèle de recherche, à la légende de Thalès. En apercevant le philosophe au fond du puits, la petite servante thrace trouve bien ridicule celui qui, préoccupé de découvrir ce qu'il y a au ciel, n'avait pas vu ce qui se trouvait sous ses pieds (Platon, 1950, vol. 2, p. 132). C'est qu'elle n'avait rien compris. En effet, le premier des philosophes ne serait pas tombé dans le puits; il y serait plutôt descendu et cela, parce que l'obscurité lui permettait de mieux observer le ciel comme au bout d'une lunette. Ainsi, contrairement à ceux qui montent dans leur tour pour regarder de haut le monde, le premier des philosophes aurait compris que, pour étudier les choses du ciel, il faut s'enfoncer dans la terre (Godin, 1986, p. 438). Cette interprétation de la légende inspire confiance à qui, s'étant donné la tâche d'aborder un sujet doublement difficile, entend, de plus, le faire à partir d'une position d'obscurité: celle de l'auteur qui fait partie du problème. Cette réflexion ne vient ni d'au-dessus, ni d'en dehors du terrain; c'est, de plus, au milieu des praticiens de l'enseignement qu'elle souhaite retourner.²

Cet article part du postulat que la formation est fondamentale quand elle met en place les conditions de réalisation d'une pensée personnelle à l'intérieur d'une discipline. Ce qu'on appelle la tête bien faite est justement la capacité de penser, c'est-à-dire de connaître, de choisir et de répondre de ses choix. Dans le cas de l'éducateur, la tête bien faite présuppose, comme fondement, d'abord des savoirs approfondis, puis le sens de la réflexion critique qui permet de juger de ces savoirs, d'en acquérir de nouveaux et de régler son intervention sur cette réflexion. Dans une première partie, nous exposons ce que nous voyons comme problème, soit le manque de formation

fondamentale de trop d’enseignants. Dans la mesure où les programmes de formation ont été vidés de certains savoirs essentiels à la réflexion pour être remplis de savoir-faire et de techniques élaborées en vue d’une multitude de fonctions, on ne peut produire que le contraire de la tête bien faite: la tête toute faite. La seconde partie de cet article propose ce que nous croyons être une trajectoire de solution: la base philosophique qui permettrait aux enseignants de reconceptualiser d’abord ce que c’est que l’humain à éduquer, puis ce que serait éduquer en vue de l’avènement de l’humain et, enfin, ce que devient éduquer pour celui dont la profession est d’enseigner.

L’ENSEIGNANT NON FORMÉ

La réflexion désertée

L’état actuel d’in-formation des maîtres juge moins les maîtres que les idéologies qui les ont créés. L’événement Sputnik (1957) n’est que l’un des facteurs qui, au cours des années 1960, incitent le monde de la science et l’école à opérer le virage vers les sciences exactes, la technologie et la spécialisation, dévalorisant ainsi les humanités. Comme le souligne Lacour-Brossard (1986), dans “la grande famille des sciences humaines,” c’est le programme “sans mathématiques,” c’est-à-dire le plus faible, qui regroupe les étudiants qui se destinent, entre autres, aux sciences de l’éducation (p. 452). Il arrive trop souvent, comme le constatent Balthazar et Bélanger (1989), que les élèves doués s’orientent vers les facultés prestigieuses (p. 185–199); “c’est à défaut d’y être accepté qu’on se fait . . . candidat à un poste d’enseignement” (p. 199). On comprend dès lors que la question de la formation des maîtres soit devenue, pour qui se préoccupe de formation fondamentale, “une inquiétude très vive” (Laliberté, 1984, p. 97). En effet, note Gadbois (1988a), s’il est un secteur de l’université où la réforme entreprise pour le premier cycle aurait des effets importants, “c’est bien celui de la formation des enseignants” (p. 142). Parmi les premiers à souhaiter ce changement, il faut compter les meilleurs enseignants eux-mêmes. Legendre (1983) n’est pas seul à rencontrer des enseignants pour qui il devient de plus en plus évident que “la formation ne s’improvise pas à coups de techniques; (qu’)elle ne se fait pas, non plus, en une fin de semaine, si intense que soit la session” (p. 2). Ces éducateurs, observe Legendre, “aspirent à autre chose, à une éducation authentique pour eux-mêmes et leurs étudiants” (Legendre, 1983, p. 2). Aux États-Unis (Laliberté, 1983), au Canada (Gingras, 1985), en Ontario (Fullan et Connelly, 1987), et au Québec (Robert, Bujold, Doyle, Lafrenière et Ryan, 1989), on reconnaît que le solage (Dionne, 1974) de l’excellence de l’enseignement est l’enseignement offert aux futurs enseignants.

Or la majorité des enseignants ont été formés selon les principes de la pédagogie libertaire née en Europe, au début du siècle. Arrivée aux États-Unis, cette pédagogie prend le nom de “progressive education” ou celui,

mieux connu, de pédagogie centrée sur l'apprenant. Pour qui a connu les raideurs et les obscures abstractions de l'enseignement traditionnel, il est impossible de nier ou de sous-estimer les progrès qu'apporte cette nouvelle conception de l'éducation. Le "vieux temps" avait sa bonne mesure de moins bon (Giroux, 1990b). Pourtant, l'état actuel des choses en éducation impose de réexaminer les thèses progressives et cela, pour assurer le progrès.

Le mot d'ordre de l'éducation progressive est bien connu: "We teach people, not subjects." Désormais, l'objectif de répondre aux besoins exprimés (Bode, 1956, p. 144–145), de cultiver les intérêts particuliers et de s'exprimer librement remplacent le souci de maîtriser une discipline. Le concept même de connaissances générales évoque un éventail de généralités; un "capharnaüm de cours (où) . . . la culture (si elle y est encore) est éparpillée" (Balthazar et Bélanger, 1989, p. 185). Aujourd'hui, le terme d'humanisme a lui-même perdu, dans l'esprit d'une vaste majorité d'enseignants, ses connotations philosophiques. L'humanisme d'Erasme, des Arts et des Sciences a été remplacé par celui de la *Third Force psychology* et de la psychothérapie non directive qui met en cause non seulement les concepts définitionnels d'apprendre, d'enseigner et d'enseignant, mais encore ceux de discipline intellectuelle et d'initiation à une discipline. Ainsi, l'objectif de former l'esprit fait place à celui de faciliter l'épanouissement de la personnalité ou de promouvoir l'adaptation sociale. On forme non plus des citoyens du monde mais des individus bien ajustés à leur environnement, quand ce n'est pas simplement bien dans leur peau. C'est l'ère de l'école comme "life adjustment" (Bode, 1956, p. 145), celle qui a malheureusement dégénéré en ce que Morin (1973) appelle "l'opinionite pédagogique" (p. 45), que Robichaud (1986) nomme "pédagogie du nombril" et qu'une étudiante décrit en ces termes: "Tu me regardes-je-te-regarde-et-on-se raconte-notre vécu" (p. 603).

Avec l'éducation dite progressive, le corpus des humanités s'est trouvé vidé en tout ou en partie de l'étude de l'histoire (Neatby, 1953, p. 235) qui a été remplacée par les discussions sur l'actualité. Certes, l'histoire de l'éducation, pas plus que l'histoire ne donne de réponses toutes faites aux interrogations contemporaines. Elle contient pourtant, en germe, toutes les réformes. En éducation, la perspective historique permet de considérer, par exemple, avec leurs apports réels, les faiblesses notables des pédagogies des Freinet, Montessori, Decroly. Le recul historique montre que déjà, en 1936, Schmid mettait sérieusement en question l'idéologie du maître—camarade, précurseur direct du facilitateur rogérien. Aux États-Unis, Bestor (1953, 1955) mettait radicalement en cause les idées dites progressistes; au Canada, Neatby (1953) en avait fait autant. Comme l'histoire universelle, l'histoire de l'éducation est un outil de première qualité dans l'effort actuel de dégager l'essentiel. Sans verser dans l'illusion du *nil novi sub sole*, la conscience historique sait retrouver ce qui perdure à travers les vagues, le fondamental qui ne vieillit jamais. Les enseignants à qui l'on présente, par exemple, les

perspectives divergentes de Socrate et de Protagoras, ou les vues éducatives de Locke (1692/1966) et celles de Kant (1776–1786/1966) ne manquent pas d'en reconnaître toute l'actualité; à leurs yeux, le concept de démocratisation de l'éducation tel qu'exprimé au XVII^e siècle dans *La grande didactique* (Coménius, 1630/1952) a de quoi rivaliser avec celui qui sous-tend le *Democracy and Education* (Dewey, 1916). En plus de donner une juste perspective, l'histoire des idées en éducation permet une réelle prospective, celle qui entrevoit les axes du développement et fournit ce qu'on pourrait se permettre d'appeler le microscope nécessaire pour éviter la "cacophonie existante dans le secteur de la formation des éducateurs" (Legendre, 1983, p. 5).

Parmi les humanités, il n'est peut-être pas de discipline qui ait été aussi vidée de son sens et dérobée de son importance que la philosophie. Aujourd'hui, dans les facultés d'éducation, le vocable philosophique en est venu à signifier à peu près n'importe quel discours vaste et vague exprimé en termes ésotériques. Il arrive trop souvent qu'au début d'un cours, chacun entende y aller de sa "propre philosophie." C'est dire, d'abord, que pour toute une génération d'enseignants qui ont été éduqués dans l'idéologie de l'expression-libre-de-mon-opinion-personnelle, le concept d'une argumentation fondée sur la raison et non sur la force du sentiment fait l'effet d'une notion étrangère. C'est dire aussi l'effort qu'exigera l'exercice de trouver et d'explicitier les présupposés d'un texte pédagogique pour ensuite en faire la critique. C'est dire enfin la satisfaction intellectuelle des enseignants qui découvrent que ce qui leur était apparu de prime abord, comme un fouillis de thèmes, de questions et de réponses pédagogiques, peut s'organiser et s'éclaircir à partir de quelques postulats de métaphysique, d'épistémologie, d'anthropologie, d'axiologie et de politique. La formation des enseignants se trouve encore vidée d'un élément indispensable à la réflexion quand elle ne mentionne pas les sources nominalistes, existentialistes, idéalistes, pragmatiques ou marxistes des pensées et des pratiques éducatives contemporaines. Sans connaissance critique de ces fondements, comment évaluer, comment même comprendre les Dewey, Rogers, Illich, Freire, Skinner? En négligeant la formation historique et philosophique, c'est la capacité même de penser que l'on met en cause.

C'est cette même capacité de penser qui se trouve compromise quand on néglige la qualité de la langue orale et écrite. Certes la profession de l'enseignement n'est pas la seule à compter, parmi ses membres, trop d'individus qui ne savent pas s'exprimer clairement et écrire correctement; il reste pourtant que les enseignants font profession d'enseigner à parler et à écrire. Il n'est plus nécessaire, aujourd'hui, de démontrer qu'on ne peut apprendre à penser sans apprendre une langue et qu'inversement, apprendre une langue ne se fait pas sans logique, sans analyse, sans opérations de synthèse. En insistant sur la maîtrise de la langue, le mouvement de revalorisation de la formation fondamentale dit clairement, entre autres choses que la capacité intellectuelle elle-même est compromise par ce que

Healy (1990) appelle “sagging syntax” [and] “sloppy semantics.” Ces défauts de la langue, écrit l’auteure, sont à l’origine de “fuzzy thinking” (p. 105–122). L’auteure souligne le phénomène familier du “‘You know . . .’ substituted for verbal—and mental—precision; it is up to the listener to fill in the blanks.” Il s’agit d’un problème connu en clinique sous le nom de “language disability” (p. 109). La langue écrite n’est pas sans en être touchée. Ainsi, observe toujours Healy (1990), “Now, university professors are starting to complain that they must teach writing and thinking skills they used to take for granted.” [Ainsi, comme dit un professeur de Harvard:] “What is interesting to me is how frequently I cannot get my students to write down what they mean . . . they simply cannot do many of the things that were fundamental fifteen years ago, when I started here” (Healy, 1990, p. 112).

Au cours des années 1960–1970, c’est du concept même d’enseignement que la profession enseignante s’est vue vidée. En sciences humaines, ils étaient nombreux, les cours qui commençaient par des déclarations semblables à celle-ci: “Mesdames, messieurs, nous n’avons rien à vous apprendre” (Balthazar et Bélanger, 1989, p. 169). C’est que, comme le rapporte Kozol (1985), on avait fait comprendre aux enseignants: “None of us may really know much more than anybody else . . . no one ought to set out with the will to *teach* (. . .)” (p. 207). “‘Teach’, in effect, is a dirty word. ‘Learn’ [is] the required verb for those who [do] not wish to be accused of speaking or behaving with the strength or knowledge they [possess]” (p. 207). Non seulement l’enseignant se voit-il alors délesté de son autorité; au dire du ministère de l’Éducation d’Ontario (Hall & Dennis, 1968) il doit apprendre à penser comme les enfants et à réagir comme eux, par exemple à la multiplicité des impressions qui, dans un montage audio-visuel, changent subitement de contextes de temps et de lieux ou passent sans raison apparente d’objet à sujet (p. 92). L’enfant qui, dans la thérapie non directive, devient le modèle du jugement des valeurs (“l’évaluation organismique,” Rogers et Kinget, 1976, p. 197), devient ici celui du non-jugement épistémologique.

Les tâches multipliées

Plus ou moins vidés de grandes idées à penser, les programmes de formation professionnelle se sont remplis de choses à faire. D’ailleurs, depuis Dewey et avec le pragmatisme, l’activité de penser consiste précisément à élaborer et à mettre en oeuvre un plan d’action; la réflexion sur les fins cède la place à l’invention et à l’expérimentation des moyens, l’acquisition des savoir-faire prend le pas sur celle des savoirs. L’école dite progressive qui s’est donné comme mandat de répondre aux besoins—et à tous les besoins—de chaque élève, en assurant sa formation intégrale a, comme le constate aujourd’hui l’ensemble de la recherche et, en particulier Gadbois (1988b), trop et beaucoup trop embrassé (p. 180). La pédagogie progressive considère que toute activité a en elle-même une valeur éducative; elle préconise le

développement de chacun du point de vue de chacune de ses virtualités et cela, sans se demander si toutes les virtualités sont saines et si l'école est vraiment la seule institution sociale capable d'éduquer. C'est charger l'enseignant, et surtout celui qui prend à coeur son métier, d'une tâche démesurée. Déjà, en 1956, Bestor citait le “Teacher's Tortured Timetable,” article paru deux ans plus tôt (p. 203). Les enseignants aux yeux de qui on a d'abord vidé de leur différence spécifique les concepts d'éduquer et d'enseigner, d'autorité et d'autoritarisme, d'intégration et d'agglomération des matières, se trouvent maintenant la tête bien pleine de tâches à faire.

Il y a de cela quarante ans, en Ontario, une étude de près de mille pages entendait fonder l'éducation sur les besoins de l'enfant tels que conçus par les “current opinions” du temps (Hope, 1950, p. 747). L'un des commissaires, W.H. Clarke, enregistre sa dissidence sur plusieurs points importants, entre autres celui de la formation des maîtres (Hope, 1950, p. 906). Au sujet de ce qu'il voit déjà comme un “over-crowded curriculum,” Clarke écrit: “The enquiry must properly consider whether it is better to do less (than to attempt to ‘educate the whole child’ in ‘all aspects of growth’) and to do it excellently” (Hope, 1950, p. 907). Il faudra attendre trente ans et le mouvement de revalorisation de la formation fondamentale pour que les propos de Clarke sur les “core subjects” et en particulier sur l'apprentissage de la langue maternelle (Hope, 1950, p. 907) soient entendus. En effet, vingt ans après le rapport Hope, l'Ontario continue d'affirmer: “The interests and needs of the individual child are becoming to an increasing degree the basis of the curriculum” (Hall & Dennis, 1968, p. 121). L'enseignant est dépeint non pas en termes de compétences professionnelles mais de qualités personnelles. Il est la “inspiring . . . vigorous, informed, friendly person who likes children, who is able to establish a cheerful, social, permissive climate . . .” (Hall & Dennis, 1968, p. 121). Enseigner est une tâche qui exige non pas un vaste et solide savoir, mais “consummate skill, inspired insight, enthusiastic zeal and dedicated devotion” (Hall & Dennis, 1968, p. 123).

En effet, seul un dévouement sans discrimination, un zèle assez aveugle, pourrait porter un enseignant à s'adonner à toutes les tâches qu'on entend lui assigner. Quel enseignant ne se reconnaîtrait dans les propos de ses collègues d'ailleurs et de plus de trois décennies passées: “We, ‘in the trade’ . . . [are] . . . engaged in [activities such as] 1. Selling government stamps; . . . 3. Supervising the dismissal of individuals, groups or the entire class for physical ed., orchestra, music lessons, . . . manual training, religious instruction, examination by the school doctor and nurse; . . . 5. Collecting money for . . . class picture . . . 6. Collecting canned goods . . .” (Bode, 1956, p. 203). Au Québec, au cours des années 1967–1969, une commission royale d'enquête fait l'inventaire des fonctions attribuées à l'enseignant. Au jardin d'enfants, on en dénombre soixante; à l'élémentaire, deux cent soixante-dix; au secondaire, trois cent dix-sept; à l'université, cent vingt-neuf. En 1975, une commission d'étude détermine, pour les enseignants de l'élémentaire et du secondaire, trente-six tâches principales, chacune précisée par dix-neuf

caractéristiques: description, exigences, qualifications, objectifs, matières, source, outils (Legendre, 1981, p. 169–170). C’est que l’école est devenue, dans les termes de Boyer (1984), le “crisis center” d’une société qui lui demande tantôt d’aider l’adolescente enceinte, tantôt de reconforter le jeune victime de violence familiale, tantôt d’accompagner l’adolescent aux prises avec le traumatisme de la séparation de ses parents (p. 529). Balthazar et Bélanger (1989) énumèrent aussi les responsabilités dévolues à l’école: veiller à la santé des jeunes, initier à la protection de l’environnement, donner une bonne éducation sexuelle, familiariser avec l’ensemble de la société par des visites, initier à l’économie et à la politique, orienter vers une carrière, apprendre à devenir des consommateurs avertis, savoir se prémunir contre les MTS et les drogues (p. 49). Pour que la liste soit plus complète, il faudrait ajouter: organiser les fêtes de l’Halloween, de la Sainte-Catherine, de Noël, de la Saint-Valentin, du carnaval, de Pâques et de la fin de l’année. Et tout au long de l’année, organiser et animer les activités péri- et parascolaires. Cela, en formant de bons citoyens, en intégrant les immigrants, en veillant à guérir le racisme. La dernière mission attribuée à l’école est celle de l’éducation planétaire. Idéalement, la sensibilisation aux problèmes planétaires tels la population mondiale, la crise énergétique, la faim et la pauvreté du Tiers-Monde doivent faire l’objet de tous les cours et cela, depuis l’école élémentaire. Il est à noter que pour aborder ces questions, le “Global Teacher” n’a pas à former à la discipline de l’histoire; il n’a pas non plus à y être formé. Le modèle rogérien lui recommande au contraire d’éviter de transmettre des connaissances, ce qui facilitera l’apprentissage des élèves (Alladin, 1989, p. 9). Il est certes inévitable que chaque désordre social se manifeste à l’école; reste à voir si, de ce simple fait, chaque problème de société doit se transformer en mandat de l’école.

Nombreux sont les enseignants qui diraient aujourd’hui encore avec Neatby (1953) que la multiplicité et la nature des tâches qu’on leur attribue a pour résultat qu’ils n’ont plus ni l’énergie ni le goût de poursuivre leur développement intellectuel (p. 234). D’ailleurs dans la majorité des milieux enseignants, la vie intellectuelle et le savoir théorique sont plutôt des comme étant difficilement conciliables avec le savoir-faire professionnel.

La tête toute faite

Vidé de certains savoirs essentiels à la réflexion critique, et rempli de descriptions de tâches péri- et para-professionnelles, le discours adressé aux enseignants risque fort de produire des têtes toutes faites. Ici encore, le phénomène n’est pas d’hier. Déjà, en 1953, Neatby note le fait que trop d’enseignants partent pour le terrain munis d’un ensemble d’outils qui, leur assure-t-on, sont parfaitement adaptés aux tâches qui les attendent. Ce qui leur manque, écrit-elle, c’est une vision (p. 125). En effet, quand elle se pose les questions “en vue de quoi,” la pédagogie préoccupée d’“accountability,” se met à répondre dans les termes le plus proche possible du mesu-

nable, ici et maintenant. Après—et souvent avec—l’ère de l’enfant-roi, c’est le règne des objectifs opérationnels (Bloom, Engelhart, Furst, Hill, & Krathwohl, 1956). On se souvient des “teacher-proof kits” des années 1970. Pour qui voudrait croire que c’est là chose du passé, l’ouvrage de Smith (1986) offre ample matière à réflexion. C’est, entre autres choses, à cette mentalité que pense Legendre (1983) quand il refuse un titre qui aurait pu être: *Le coffre à outils de l’éducateur*. Il explique: “On se serait attendu à un kit-du-parfait-petit-technicien-de-l’enseignement . . . à un guide pratico-pratique” (p. 1–2). L’engouement pour la technologie vient du fait que, pour acquérir un statut de science, l’éducation s’est éloignée de la philosophie. Dans les termes de Legendre, elle a “[accepté] un mariage de raison avec la psychologie [expérimentale]”; mariage qui n’a ni été très heureux—“l’époux polygame [imposant] ses préceptes”—ni “produit des enfants forts” (1981, p. 112). Le passage n’a de badin que le ton. En effet, conclut l’auteur, “l’éducation porte encore aujourd’hui les séquelles d’une telle aventure” (Legendre, 1981, p. 112).

Les bureaucrates, rédacteurs de programmes et de guides pédagogiques ne manquent pas de souligner, pour les élèves, l’importance du développement de la pensée critique. Pourtant, quand il se produit chez les enseignants d’expérience, le recul critique face à la nouveauté est interprété comme “résistance au changement.” Au cours des derniers quarante ans, les thèses de la pédagogie progressive ont été présentées comme autant d’articles d’un credo. On invite certes les enseignants à travailler à la révision et à la mise en oeuvre des programmes mais on ne leur permet pas de mettre en question les principes et les orientations de fond de ces programmes. À ceux à qui on recommande d’enseigner à penser, on dicte quoi penser, quoi faire et comment. Ainsi, Daly (1969) souligne que le Rapport Hall-Dennis dont le but était de libérer l’école de l’autorité de la tradition verse dans l’impérialisme progressiviste (p. 43). L’auteur note: le chapitre quatre du Rapport ne perd pas de temps à exposer les pour et les contre des examens; il en affirme les désavantages (p. 26). De même, ajoute-t-il, le Rapport prêche la démocratie, mais sans même suggérer la complexité du concept; sans avoir l’air de poser certaines questions comme, par exemple, se pourrait-il qu’un régime politique tel qu’on le vit dans le monde adulte soit si profondément différent d’un régime scolaire, que ce qui est bon pour l’un soit mauvais pour l’autre? (p. 13).

Il serait facile de dresser une longue liste de ceux qui, au cours des derniers vingt ans, ont mis en question les préceptes de la nouvelle pédagogie et cela, en mettant au jour ses principes. Qu’il suffise ici d’évoquer quelques noms bien connus de chercheurs mais trop peu des utilisateurs de ces pédagogies: Hannoun, 1972; Morin, 1973; Snyders, 1974. Reboul (1984) fait état de ce qu’il appelle le dogmatisme novateur et de la faiblesse de ses métaphores horticoles (p. 21–27). Pour prendre une distance critique face au discours dominant, il faudra plus de formation historique et une formation philosophique de base. Plus la formation à l’enseignement en est vidée, plus

l'enseignant est réduit à accepter ou à refuser en bloc ce qui lui est présenté comme nouveau. Prendre l'un ou l'autre parti, c'est trahir une tête toute faite.

Avec l'histoire et la philosophie, la langue et le langage sont un instrument indispensable de la pensée; de celle qu'on veut communiquer et de celle qu'on espère susciter. Or, le langage pédagogique est, depuis longtemps, reconnu pour son ésotérisme. Déjà en 1950, Clarke avouait: "It is true that I find it difficult to discover the meaning of the jargon so often used in writing about educational concepts and objectives" (Hope, 1950, p. 899). Neatby (1953) donne aussi plusieurs exemples de ce langage (p. 30-32; p. 323). Elle cite un long passage d'un article intitulé "Discipline in the New Curriculum" dans lequel un professeur à la formation des maîtres "prefers to veil his argument in the decent obscurity of educational jargon" (p. 292). Aux États-Unis, Koerner (1963) dénonce ce qu'il nomme "Educando." Il s'agit, écrit l'auteur, d'un patois pernicieux qui masque l'absence de pensée et s'alimente de slogans et d'incantations. Dans un chapitre où il décrit les traits caractéristiques de l'Educando, l'auteur note que cet argot, comme n'importe quel *newspeak*, rend impossibles certains modes de pensée (p. 282-296). Legendre (1981), pour sa part, ne manque pas de souligner le phénomène par une image qui, au sens le plus concret de l'expression, vaut mille mots (p. 54), et Robichaud (1986), quant à lui, fait grâce à ses auditeurs "du vocabulaire ampoulé qui orne maintenant [les] guides pédagogiques" (p. 601).

Reboul (1984) qui étudie la question du langage en éducation donne, du jargon pédagogique, cet exemple qui mérite d'être cité: "Même dans un processus d'apprentissage curriculaire, les techniques éducationnelles donneront aux disciplinaires en formation des outils pour accroître leurs habiletés relationnelles" (p. 78).³ C'est l'endoctrinement par le langage que dénonce Reboul (1984) quand il établit un lexique de mots-pièges (p. 55-79), en soulignant que ces mots sont classifiés comme ayant en eux-mêmes une connotation de valeur, par exemple: *croissance, autonomie, créativité, innovation*, ou une connotation péjorative, par exemple, *contrainte, reproduction, sélection, élite* (p. 82). L'auteur étudie aussi le slogan éducatif (p. 85-97) et les formules magiques de l'éducation (p. 98) pour montrer que slogans, clichés, mots-chocs sont faits, en éducation comme ailleurs, pour véhiculer du "prêt-à-penser qui dispense de penser" (p. 97). Or, conclut Reboul, quand le langage "en pédagogie comme ailleurs, n'exprime plus la pensée, il la réprime" (p. 100).

Certes, il n'est ni possible ni souhaitable de retourner à l'école traditionnelle. Pourtant, des décennies d'expérience montrent bien qu'enseigner une discipline, c'est l'enseigner à quelqu'un, que le savant n'est pas, de ce fait, mauvais pédagogue; qu'en somme la vision dichotomique qui fait voir comme s'excluant nécessairement les fonctions d'enseigner et d'apprendre est d'une grande naïveté. C'est l'expérience des dernières décennies qui invite l'école à repenser son mandat et les enseignants à chercher, au-delà des savoir-faire, le savoir.

L’HUMAIN À FORMER PAR L’ENSEIGNEMENT

L’humain

La pensée éducative des dix dernières années s’efforce de dégager le fondamental. Le concept de fondement lui-même n’est pas sans susciter les palabres lexicographiques; nous retiendrons, pour notre part, l’idée de fondement comme étant ce à quoi on revient quand les choses s’embrouillent, ou, dans le vocabulaire de la construction et la langue de nos origines, le solage (Dionne, 1974). Ce n’est pas en vain que les écrits américains parlent, depuis vingt ans, de “core curriculum” (Laliberté, 1984, p. 92). Le “core” est ce qui contient, en germe ou en graine, ce que sera le fruit. C’est le noyau, le “innermost heart” des choses, dit le dictionnaire d’Oxford. Pour retrouver le fondamental, l’éducation devra retrouver le coeur le plus intime, l’essence de l’humain à éduquer. Mais le concept d’essence humaine est justement l’un de ceux qui se sont le plus effrités. Les enseignants d’aujourd’hui font partie d’une culture qui nie l’essence humaine et cela de deux façons contradictoires. D’une part, depuis Darwin, le matérialisme métaphysique veut qu’entre les autres espèces vivantes et l’espèce humaine, il n’y ait de différence que de degré; entre l’animal et l’humain, c’est donc la continuité ontologique. D’autre part et curieusement, entre les humains c’est la parfaite discontinuité. Certes, la reconnaissance et le respect des différences et des particularités est indispensable à la vie civilisée. Pourtant, comment affirmer les droits fondamentaux et la dignité de la personne sans supposer, au-delà de la diversité des humains, ce qui, dans chaque personne, constitue l’humain? La négation du concept de nature humaine est l’une des erreurs philosophiques que souligne Adler (1985, p. 156–166). Dans un monde qui multiplie les pluriels, l’essence s’est, pour ainsi dire, dissoute dans les existences.

Le mouvement de revalorisation de la formation fondamentale pourrait être vu comme un vaste effort de réinventer l’essence humaine, ce qu’Aristote appelait la forme.⁴ Ici, la forme est le principe dynamique ou l’âme qui pétrit la matière de l’intérieur, l’organise, la structure, la détermine, si bien qu’elle acquiert une manière typique d’exister, c’est-à-dire d’être et de se manifester dans le monde par son action. La forme est l’élément définitionnel de la matière, cela même qui constitue une espèce, c’est-à-dire un groupe d’individus qui, d’une part, face à ceux qui leur ressemblent, se démarquent de façon radicale et, d’autre part, reconnaissent dans leurs semblables, au-delà ou en deça des particularités, une radicale continuité. En éducation peut-être plus que partout ailleurs, il faut rappeler aujourd’hui que la forme ou l’essence humaine est l’esprit, c’est-à-dire la capacité de connaître, de réfléchir, de choisir et de répondre de ses choix. La formation retrouve donc le fondamental quand, s’éloignant de la notion d’apprendre quoi penser ou comment s’adapter à la société, elle souligne l’importance d’apprendre à penser. Reste à savoir ce que c’est que penser. Les oeuvres

remarquables d'Adler (1957, 1967, 1990), d'Arendt (1978), de Heidegger (1983), de Lonergan (1968) offrent ample matière à réflexion sur ce sujet. Qu'il suffise ici de voir en quoi une meilleure conception de l'activité humaine de penser pourrait éclairer la réflexion et la pratique des enseignants.

La capacité humaine de penser est d'abord un pouvoir d'abstraction. La pédagogie a retenu d'Aristote la nécessité de ce qu'elle appelle "partir du concret" mais, avec Locke, elle a oublié qu'il faut aussi, savoir en partir. Postman (1979) n'est pas le seul à souligner les effets nocifs pour l'esprit de l'abus d'audiovisuel. Le connaître et le penser humains sont certainement liés aux perceptions des sens et à l'expérience immédiate, mais ils sont loin d'être entièrement circonscrits par eux. Pour l'humain, percevoir le donné concret, particulier, immédiat ce n'est pas encore le connaître. Il faudra, pour cela, le concevoir, le définir, l'analyser, trouver en quoi, et à quels points de vue il ressemble à autre chose et s'en distingue. L'existence des civilisations rappelle le fait que l'esprit humain sait partir de la réalité pour concevoir la possibilité, c'est-à-dire ce qui n'est pas perçu et même ce qui échappe à toute possibilité de perception. Sur ce point, Skinner (1948) illustre, dans le *Walden Two* exactement le contraire de ce qu'il s'applique à nier dans l'ensemble de son oeuvre et particulièrement dans sa conception de l'enseignement (1968). Du point de vue du désir, l'esprit humain est non seulement capable de poursuivre un bien réel et d'en jouir, il peut encore concevoir une fin, c'est-à-dire un bien jugé—à tort ou à raison—comme digne d'être réalisé, et cela même au prix de certains biens immédiats. Ainsi, l'esprit humain qui, sur le plan cognitif, est la capacité de se dégager du concret pour en concevoir l'idée devient, sur le plan affectif, capacité de prendre des distances face à un bien offert, pour vivre d'un idéal. C'est pourquoi, si la pédagogie soucieuse de respecter la personne doit l'accepter et l'appuyer dans ce qu'elle est, elle doit aussi et tout autant, voir et appeler en elle tout ce qu'elle peut devenir (Giroux, 1988).

Penser, c'est aussi juger; c'est peser, critiquer. Le penseur est le *kritikos*, l'arbitre qui, dans un débat (*krisis*) rend un jugement décisif. Devant une proposition qui se présente comme vraie, la personne est appelée à poser un jugement de vérité. Avant de déclarer la certitude, la fausseté ou la probabilité d'une proposition, la pensée trouve, sous ce qui est proposé, ce qui est posé comme vrai. Ainsi, penser, c'est discriminer, distinguer entre croyance, connaissance et opinion. Au chapitre de la pensée comme jugement, il serait nécessaire de rappeler, pour le mettre en question, le principe qu'au cours des années 1960, et avec l'ère du rogérisme, tous les enseignants ont lu, entendu, appris et peut-être répété: "il ne faut pas juger." Comme si juger était en soi condamner et condamner, invariablement mauvais. Il ne faut surtout pas, d'après ce principe, porter un jugement de valeur. Pourtant, l'esprit humain doit constamment juger de la valeur des choses, c'est-à-dire de leur capacité relative à procurer le bien ou ce qui convient à l'humain. Dans un jugement moral, dans un jugement médical et dans un jugement

pédagogique, la personne juge non seulement de l'efficacité relative des moyens—ce qui revient à un calcul technique (Giroux, 1990a)—mais de la justesse des fins elles-mêmes et de la juste proportion entre fins et moyens. Ainsi, le jugement de valeur, loin d'exprimer l'irrationnel exprime la prudence, celle qu'Aristote définit comme étant la sagesse elle-même, c'est-à-dire l'art de discerner une fin bonne, de choisir les moyens les plus aptes à la réaliser et de mettre en oeuvre ces moyens (Aristote, 330 av. J.-C./1972, p. 284–285). La prudence aristotélicienne, cette capacité du jugement solide et pratique, donnerait aux enseignants d'aujourd'hui, comme elle conférait au législateur grec, l'autonomie de la pensée et de l'action, qui est justement l'une des prérogatives du professionnel.

S'il est un aspect important de l'activité de penser et de juger qui a été nié, celui-là par le dogmatisme relativiste, c'est celui de hiérarchiser. En 1979, le Québec (ministère de l'Éducation du Québec) écrit au sujet des valeurs: “Dans les pages qui suivent, elles ne sont pas hiérarchisées, ne sont pas signalées par ordre d'importance” (p. 27). De son côté l'Ontario (Ontario Ministry of Education) qui, en 1969 (Committee on Religious Education, 1969) s'était gardé de nommer des valeurs, présente, en 1983 les “Values for which the schools should stand.” Il s'agit d'une liste présentée en ordre alphabétique. Ainsi, “courtesy” passe avant “honesty” et “respect for the environment,” avant “respect for others” (p. 6). Pour l'esprit, la juxtaposition des vérités produit l'incohérence; celle des valeurs entraîne l'indifférence. Quand toutes les valeurs sont d'égale valeur, tout devient également insignifiant, quand tout est acceptable comme fin de l'éducation (ministère de l'Éducation du Québec, 1979, p. 29), n'importe quoi est acceptable; du moment que rien ne s'impose, n'importe quoi pourrait être imposé; enfin, quand tout est fondamental, il ne reste plus rien de fondamental. Hier, un faux sens de hiérarchie produisait le fanatisme des valeurs supérieures; aujourd'hui, la mode du nivellement enseigne que l'ordre, l'équilibre, le discernement n'ont rien à voir dans le domaine des valeurs. Dans le domaine du vrai, cette même mode du nivellement fait perdre de vue, entre autres choses, le fait que certaines opérations de l'esprit servent de caution à d'autres. Par exemple, l'expression de l'opinion personnelle doit reposer sur des données suffisantes et adéquatement comprises; le raisonnement ne peut prendre des probabilités pour des certitudes; l'imagination créatrice est généralement le fait de qui a d'abord fait ses gammes ou maîtrisé la syntaxe et appris le vocabulaire. Au sein de la culture du nivellement, le mouvement de revalorisation de la formation fondamentale opérera ni plus ni moins que la revalorisation de la vie de l'esprit.

Former l'humain

On reconnaît aujourd'hui que les programmes de formation des maîtres “souffrent de l'absence d'une philosophie de l'éducation” (Robert, Bujold, Doyle, Lafrenière et Ryan, 1989, p. 113). Il ne serait pas inutile, en ces

temps de recherche du fondamental, de rappeler qu'une philosophie de l'éducation exige, comme préalable, une philosophie et qu'une philosophie présuppose une formation à la philosophie. En effet, les idées qu'on peut avoir sur ce qui est vérifié ou vérifiable, sur ce qui est souhaitable ou convenable et sur ce qui est faisable ont leur source dans l'idée qu'on se fait de ce que c'est que l'humain. C'est la philosophie qui permet d'identifier et d'évaluer les philosophies ou les conceptions qu'on se fait de l'éducation.

Penser l'éducation, c'est d'abord identifier la variété des fins qu'on lui assigne. Il peut s'agir d'épanouissement de la personnalité ou de formation de l'esprit, d'adaptation, de reproduction ou de reconstruction sociale (Bertrand et Valois, 1982; Eisner, 1979; Joyce & Weil, 1980; Schiro, 1980). La formation philosophique permet de découvrir dans les philosophies de l'éducation l'élément idéologique, c'est-à-dire, dans les termes de Reboul (1984), l'idée au service d'un pouvoir (p. 84). Ainsi, explique l'auteur, les diverses fins assignées à l'éducation peuvent être du type contestataire (1984, p. 15–20), novateur (p. 20–27), fonctionnel (p. 27–34), humaniste (p. 34–72), officiel (p. 43–49). L'examen philosophique des systèmes d'éducation permet de reconnaître dans chaque modèle la part d'idéologie qui s'y trouve. Elle fait voir, par exemple, comment un discours qui, sous l'influence de la psychologie expérimentale a répudié le vocabulaire des fins à cause de ses résonances prescriptives et de son caractère non mesurable, a fini par imposer, sous les vocables de "buts et objectifs opérationnels," les valeurs d'une société, et d'une idéologie. En effet, les objectifs cognitifs, affectifs et psychomoteurs de Bloom et *al.* (1956) dictent à l'individu ce qu'il doit faire pour répondre aux normes d'efficacité, de productivité et d'adaptation sociale. L'"Omniscient Outsider" (Smith, 1986, p. 125–126) est celui qui décide, tant au niveau de la formation des enseignants que pour l'éducation des élèves, quels seront les "skills to cope with the new curriculum" (Cochrane, 1987, p. 30). Les enseignants ont besoin de formation philosophique, parce que la seule façon de ne pas se laisser imposer une philosophie de l'éducation est de se mettre à la penser, c'est-à-dire d'abord d'en saisir les idées directrices, puis de se permettre de penser, s'il y a lieu, dans une autre direction.

La formation philosophique permettrait de constater ce qui est arrivé au concept de moyen quand l'école a renoncé au langage des fins pour adopter celui des buts et objectifs opérationnels. En effet, le moyen dont on se sert pour atteindre un but ou un objectif n'est pas le moyen que l'on met en oeuvre pour atteindre une fin. Viser un but, c'est chercher l'efficacité à court terme; poursuivre une fin, c'est chercher, à long terme, une forme de perfection. Pour produire un objet, il suffit que les moyens soient efficaces, mais pour accomplir une oeuvre belle ou bonne, pour participer à l'accomplissement d'une personne, seuls sont justes les moyens qui sont, en même temps, la fin en processus de réalisation. Ainsi, les moyens sont éducatifs quand, par eux-mêmes ils nourrissent le désir de connaître; quand, en fait, ils sont déjà une acquisition des connaissances, des aptitudes et des attitudes

qui permettent de continuer à apprendre. Une formation philosophique permettrait de détecter le moment où la logique des moyens se met à dicter la nature des fins; elle ferait voir que le langage des buts et objectifs a ni plus ni moins évacué le concept de fins pour le remplacer par celui de moyens. Enfin, la réflexion philosophique montrerait que la panoplie des objectifs disparates en arrive à dire que la philosophie, en éducation, consiste à ne pas avoir de philosophie.

Pour les enseignants, poser la question des fins et des moyens de l'éducation, c'est aborder celle de la fonction spécifique de l'école. Si le mouvement “Back to Basics” pouvait avoir tort dans la solution qu'il proposait, il avait raison dans la question qu'il posait, c'est-à-dire: l'école doit-elle et peut-elle continuer sur sa lancée de faire tout? Les écrits des dernières années font état d'une école qui ne sait plus en quoi consiste sa différence spécifique, celle qui la démarquerait des autres institutions sociales qui font aussi, et de plus en plus, à leur façon, de l'éducation. Depuis vingt ans, l'école s'est trouvée “enfirouâpée” (Grand'Maison, 1978), perdue (Brouillet, 1978), “désorientée” (Tremblay, 1988), “détournée” (Balthazar et Bélanger, 1989), éliminée (Illich, 1971). Postman et Weingartner, pour leur part, lui assignent une fonction de subversion (1969) pour lui attribuer, une décennie plus tard, un mandat de conservation (1979).

Le facteur le plus propre à désorienter l'école est l'anti-intellectualisme, la phobie déguisée en mépris du savoir et de l'élite intellectuelle. L'école, devenue progressive, décrète que désormais, la formation de l'esprit par les arts et les sciences ne peut servir que les besoins spéciaux d'une minorité d'élèves destinés aux études universitaires (Bode, 1956, p. 154). Pour la majorité, ce sont désormais les “real-life problems” qui formeront le programme (Bode, 1956, p. 144). Ainsi, déjà en 1953, Neatby observe que, dans l'ensemble du système d'éducation en Ontario, l'évaluation et la promotion des élèves, fondées sur des objectifs de développement psychosocial, “have little to do with intellectual achievement as such” (p. 217). En 1968, le rapport de la Commission Hall-Dennis déclare que désormais, en Ontario, les fonctions traditionnelles de l'école et des enseignants, soit la transmission de l'héritage culturel commun, se trouvent prises en charge par la télévision et les autres médias. La transmission des connaissances étant assurée, l'école “must emphasize instead the development of individuality . . . and must seek at the same time to create a balance between conformity and individuality” (Hall & Dennis, 1968, p. 159). Ce n'est pas d'hier qu'à l'école, former une élite intellectuelle a quelque chose d'anti-démocratique—la formation d'une élite sportive, par contre, n'est pas frappée d'élitisme (Balthazar et Bélanger, 1989, p. 40; Neatby, 1953, p. 92, 97, 215). Aujourd'hui, l'excellence intellectuelle n'est le thème central que de certaines écoles ou de certains programmes, ceux de douance. À l'université, les exigences élevées, l'effort intellectuel et la possibilité d'échec sont justement ce qui fait la faculté prestigieuse, celle qui se démarque des autres. C'est l'excellence intellectuelle que le mouvement de revalorisation

de la formation fondamentale cherche à retrouver, d'abord en soulageant l'école de ses objectifs exubérants (Neatby, 1953, p. 31–32), ce qui reviendrait à suivre le conseil de Gadbois (1988b): “On pose les bornes de son champ avant de commencer à labourer” (p. 181). À la fin de son enquête sur la formation fondamentale aux États-Unis, Laliberté (1984) souligne les convergences notables autour de certains sujets jugés plus importants que d'autres. Il s'agit des disciplines des arts et des sciences.

L'école que Sizer (1986) veut reconstruire et non seulement rénover ferait moins afin de faire mieux; ainsi, elle aurait tout à voir avec l'amélioration des conditions d'apprentissage des élèves et de travail des enseignants (p. 19). L'école reconstruite serait une réponse à ce que Neatby (1953) réclamait au nom des enseignants, “the freedom . . . to do what is their obvious business—namely teaching” (p. 277). C'est ce que, trente ans plus tard, recommande le rapport *A Nation at Risk* (National Commission on Excellence in Education, 1983) et ce que les enseignants eux-mêmes réclament: “Afin d'améliorer la qualité de nos écoles publiques, nous revendiquons le droit d'enseigner sans être dérangés. Nous demandons une diminution des matières enseignées” (Balthazar et Bélanger, 1989, p. 51). Aujourd'hui, l'école qui voudrait sérieusement développer la personne dans toutes ses dimensions pourrait le faire non plus en étendant sa périphérie mais en retrouvant son centre. Kant écrit: “Il importe avant tout que les enfants apprennent à penser. Cela concerne les principes dont toutes les actions découlent” (1776/1786/1966, p. 83). Neatby (1953) fait remarquer que même un objectif aussi louable en soi que l'éducation morale est dangereux “as long as we neglect and starve the mind” (p. 335). Sizer (1986) note, pour sa part, que, même si l'école avait pour mission de résoudre les problèmes sociaux, elle ne pourrait faire mieux que d'enseigner à observer avec attention, penser avec clarté et s'exprimer avec précision (p. 22). C'est à cette sorte d'école que pense Desbiens (1986) quand il la définit comme étant constituée de quatre choses: des savoirs, des savoirs transmissibles, des spécialistes chargés de transmettre des savoirs, une institution ayant pour fonction de mettre en présence, d'une manière réglée, les spécialistes qui transmettent et les sujets à qui l'on transmet (p. 27–28). C'est l'école que Robichaud (1986) met sur pied en sa qualité de directeur. “Une école qui, préférant les finalités aux objectifs, veut mettre ses élèves en contact avec les choses de l'esprit et les grands esprits pour les enraciner dans l'humanité à laquelle ils appartiennent et leur donner accès au trésor commun de l'humanité” (p. 603).

. . . *par l'enseignement*

S'il est une profession qui a été secouée jusque dans ses fondements par l'anti-intellectualisme, c'est bien celle de l'enseignement. En effet, à quoi reconnaît-on le professionnel, sinon au savoir qui dépasse les savoirs du profane; que respecte-t-on dans le jugement professionnel, sinon l'autonomie

que donnent la solidité et l’ampleur des connaissances? La recherche et l’expérience démontrent que l’excellence en éducation passe sans aucune équivoque par la revalorisation de la profession enseignante. Pour rompre avec la tradition du *disdascalos* regardant de haut le *paidagogos*, il faudra que l’éducation se fasse une meilleure place parmi les carrières prestigieuses et difficiles. Pour le moment, elle se situe au bas du tableau que présente Legendre (1981). L’auteur déplore le fait qu’en formation des maîtres, la note A est vue comme normale, le B signifie médiocre, le C est déshonorant et le D, impensable; en somme, l’idée de démocratisation de l’enseignement en est venue à signifier le droit au diplôme (p. 187). Certes, les facultés d’éducation ne détiennent pas le monopole de la facilité; c’est pourtant là que le manque de goût pour la vie intellectuelle a les pires effets. Dans un article où il traite de la nouvelle orientation à donner à la formation des maîtres aux États-Unis, Laliberté (1983) note: “maîtriser le programme de formation générale conçu pour les écoles secondaires, ce qui n’est pas le cas, à l’heure actuelle, pour les enseignants en exercice à l’école secondaire” (p. 160). L’expérience montre que les États-Unis ne sont pas le seul endroit où le fait d’imposer, en faculté d’éducation, les exigences de la formation fondamentale au secondaire est perçu comme étant d’une singulière exigence.

Pour former des maîtres, il faut faire la première place non pas au savoir-faire mais au savoir. Certes, il y aura toujours le savant qui ne sait pas communiquer, faire apprendre ou enseigner; cela ne prouve pas, pourtant, que pour mieux communiquer la connaissance et le goût d’apprendre, il soit préférable de ne pas être trop connaissant. Il est important, pour les enseignants d’aujourd’hui et pour ceux qui leur enseignent, de lire ce que Neatby écrivait dès 1953: “It seems paradoxical to find the Canadian businessman arguing for less vocational training and the professional educator arguing for more” (p. 263). Ce n’est donc ni d’hier ni seulement aux États-Unis qu’on peut observer: “For the most part, the members of the teaching profession are overtrained and undereducated” (Adler, 1988, p. 79). Ce n’est ni d’hier ni non plus seulement ailleurs que ceux qui pensent l’éducation reconnaissent le fait que “les intuitions pédagogiques les plus valables s’enracinent dans l’excellence des connaissances académiques et non dans la connaissance des trucs du métier” (Desbiens, 1960, p. 105). Aux yeux de Reboul (1988), un enseignement qui n’est que professionnel et emprisonne l’individu dans un métier revient à de l’endoctrinement (p. 117).

Si l’enseignant doit connaître sa matière, il doit aussi connaître, non seulement un éventail de moyens pédagogiques ou la technologie éducative, mais son métier. Et d’abord, l’histoire des idées qui ont marqué et marquent encore ce métier. Dans tous les domaines, l’histoire sert de microscope, c’est-à-dire d’instrument contre la myopie. C’est que, comme toutes les questions importantes, les questions d’éducation ne peuvent être comprises que situées dans leur matrice historique. Ainsi, la vision macroscopique permettrait non seulement de comprendre mais de juger, par exemple, dans

quelle mesure les idées et les méthodes sont vraiment nouvelles et véritablement améliorées.

Connaître son métier, ce serait aussi, pour l'enseignant, repenser avec le concept de moyens, le sens de l'expression "savoir-faire." Le savoir-faire de l'enseignant, la pédagogie, n'est pas une *tèchnè*. Ce qu'on appelle technologie est l'art de fabriquer un objet beau ou utile; rien n'est donc moins adapté à l'éducation et à l'enseignement que le vocabulaire de la technologie. L'enseignement est une *praxis*. Comme la morale, la politique, la médecine, c'est un art d'agir, de conduire sa vie ou la vie d'un groupe d'après un choix éclairé des fins et des moyens. Le savoir-faire de l'enseignant, loin de se limiter au savoir produire et reproduire de l'industriel, du fonctionnaire et de l'ouvrier, doit donc arriver au savoir intervenir et cela, non sur des objets mais dans la vie même de la personne. Dans les termes de Reboul (1988), le savoir-faire de l'enseignant dépasse la performance pédagogique pour arriver à la compétence, c'est-à-dire "la possibilité, dans le respect des règles d'un code, de produire librement un nombre de performances imprévisibles mais cohérentes entre elles et adaptées à la situation" (p. 186). Plus l'enseignant comprendra son métier comme une *praxis*, le lieu du jugement professionnel éclairé par la prudence aristotélicienne, moins il se verra comme un simple exécutant face à l'employeur et aux experts intervenants de tout acabit—psychologues, travailleurs sociaux, infirmières—qui, aujourd'hui lui disent ce qu'il doit faire, puisqu'ils connaissent, eux, leur discipline et leur métier.

Connaître son métier, ce serait enfin, pour l'enseignant, se construire une identité professionnelle. En 1960, Desbiens demandait: "Sommes-nous des professionnels?" La réponse, négative, était fondée sur plusieurs facteurs, entre autres, le manque de scolarisation des enseignants (p. 103–116). Aujourd'hui, même lorsque les enseignants sont plus scolarisés, ils n'ont pas acquis le sentiment d'être, dans leur domaine, ceux qu'on reconnaît comme des professionnels et cela, pour deux raisons. D'abord parce que l'idéologie du développement de toutes les virtualités humaines, de toutes les attitudes bonnes et de toutes les habiletés utiles a pour effet que l'enseignant a peine à se distinguer de tous ceux qui, d'une manière ou d'une autre, font oeuvre d'éducation. Or le professionnel connaît et respecte les limites de son domaine de compétence. Mais si l'enseignant ne se voit pas comme professionnel, c'est surtout parce que, comme le reste de la population, il reconnaît que c'est le savoir qui est la condition *sine qua non* du respect porté à une profession. Le professionnel est celui dont le savoir-faire découle de vastes connaissances; le jugement professionnel ne repose pas sur les directives de l'employeur, mais sur la puissance intellectuelle dirigée par l'intégrité personnelle.

Dans un article où ils invitent les enseignants à se réapproprier leurs compétences, les fonctions et les tâches "qui confèrent un caractère spécifique à leur activité professionnelle," Morin et Saint-Onge (1987) présentent un tableau des "caractéristiques des professionnels." Nous en donnons ici les

grandes lignes: 1. Les professionnels ont des tâches spécifiques, la façon de les exercer est reconnue et le rôle de ces tâches est explicite; 2. Leur autorité est basée sur la reconnaissance de leurs compétences supérieures par le client; 3. Leur travail n’implique pas de décisions prises en fonction de séquences préétablies; 4. Leurs décisions ont toujours des conséquences importantes pour le client; 5. Leur identification se fait davantage avec la profession qu’avec l’institution (p. 44). L’expérience même la plus limitée des milieux enseignants suffirait à susciter la question: les employeurs et tous ceux qui reprochent aux enseignants leur manque de professionnalisme pourraient-ils supporter de les voir devenir des professionnels?

Former le maître-enseignant, c’est former le savoir et le jugement professionnel. Un projet de formation fondamentale pour les enseignants exige non pas des aménagements mais une reconstruction; une reconceptualisation de fond en comble de la pensée et de la pratique de l’enseignement, autour de questions telles que: qu’est-ce qui constitue la marque de l’humain? Comment faire surgir la forme ou l’essence humaine? Comment susciter l’humain par l’enseignement?

CONCLUSION

Si les enseignants et ceux qui les forment n’ont pas inventé les idéologies qui, durant quarante ans ont dérouté les pédagogies, ils peuvent réinventer l’excellence intellectuelle qui permettrait à leur profession de prendre sa place parmi celles qui se méritent le respect. Pour cela, il faut d’abord reconnaître que, comme tout autre savoir-faire, la pédagogie ne saurait en elle-même, contenir le savoir—ni celui qu’il faut posséder, ni celui qu’il faut transmettre. Sans ce savoir, l’enseignant devient un simple exécutant face aux experts qui lui dictent les principes, la matière et parfois même la manière de son intervention. Si les élèves doivent apprendre à penser, les enseignants doivent acquérir la formation philosophique et historique qui leur permettra de penser l’éducation et l’enseignement. Cette formation leur permettra d’abord de se faire une idée la plus juste possible de ce qu’est l’humain, puis de ce que c’est que former l’humain, et de reconceptualiser ce que c’est que l’enseignement comme profession.

NOTES

¹ “Inventer,” au sens de l’étymologie latine, trouver ou découvrir ce qui est caché et au sens moderne, créer du nouveau. Je veux ici suggérer l’action de donner une pertinence nouvelle à quelque chose qui a longtemps existé.

² Si la coutume voulait qu’on dédie un simple article, j’écrirais: “Aux enseignants qui m’inspirent le respect pour cette profession. À ceux dont je suis quand je fais, dans ce métier, ce que nos pères appelaient de “la belle ouvrage.”

³ Pour le lecteur perplexe, traduction que l’auteur prend soin de présenter comme approximative: “Tout en étudiant le programme de leur discipline, les élèves-

professeurs trouveront dans les nouvelles techniques pédagogiques un moyen de développer leur sens des relations humaines” (Reboul, 1984, p. 79).

- ⁴ Ni l’essence ou l’Idée platonicienne qui surplombe la matière, ni celle que Sartre (1970) décrit comme étant: “l’ensemble des recettes et des qualités qui permettent de . . . produire le coupe-papier (c’est-à-dire n’importe quel objet et de le définir” (p. 18).

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University Education Students' Self-Perceptions of Writing

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University students in preservice education programs write primarily for their professors, whom they see as content experts and evaluators. Consequently, they find writing a difficult and often unrewarding task. This study examines the perceptions of 48 elementary education preservice teachers of their own writing vis-à-vis the written demands of their courses. Students admitted, often tacitly, that their writing difficulties resulted from reliance on the ideas and language of others, an inability or unwillingness to conceptualize an audience, uncertainty about the rhetorical features of expository and argumentative modes, and lack of understanding of a process approach to writing. The study has implications as much for teacher educators as for students in preservice education programs.

Les étudiants inscrits dans les programmes de formation des maîtres écrivent essentiellement pour leurs professeurs qu'ils voient comme des experts et des évaluateurs de contenu. Ils considèrent donc la rédaction comme une tâche difficile et peu gratifiante. L'étude dont il est fait état dans cet article analyse les perceptions qu'ont 49 stagiaires au primaire de leur écriture par rapport aux exigences de leurs cours. Les étudiants admettent, souvent tacitement, que leurs difficultés en composition sont causés par divers facteurs : ils se fient sur les idées et le langage des autres, ils sont incapables ou ne veulent pas imaginer leur auditoire, ils connaissent mal les caractéristiques rhétoriques des modes d'exposition et d'argumentation et ils ne comprennent les méthodes de rédaction. L'étude peut servir autant aux formateurs qu'aux stagiaires.

Elementary education pre-service teachers at the University of Saskatchewan should be reasonably good writers. Selected from among many applicants who have met university entrance requirements, they are a selection of a selection based on an intake quota. Having entered their second year, they have demonstrated their ability to manage the writing demands of first-year university courses primarily in the arts and sciences. (For undergraduate studies, drop-out and failure rates are highest in first year.)

One would therefore expect second-year preservice elementary education students, predominantly female, to see themselves as proficient writers in the university setting. But do they? This paper reports a study of such students mostly in second year at the University of Saskatchewan. The study sought to discover these students' attitudes toward their own writing, and how they go about writing for academic purposes. The results show that even success-

ful students are uncomfortable with their own university-level writing. Writing is difficult and often not enjoyable for many of them.

At the university undergraduate level writing is the dominant, if not exclusive, language mode through which learning is evaluated. Increasingly as course sections swell with students beyond pedagogically desirable limits for process-oriented instruction, instructors rely more and more on term papers and written examinations as means of assessment. The university has always valued writing as the most highly developed, abstract, and complex language mode. During their high school years students have been steeped in the demands of academic writing, usually taken as expository and argumentative modes of discourse. Expository writing in particular has been deemed appropriate for academic discourse because the writer takes a supposed objective stance toward the subject, often through use of the passive voice.

With the increasing tendency in education disciplines toward ethnographic and qualitative research methodologies, this long-standing tradition of expository and argumentative writing is being challenged. Increasingly we find writing by educational researchers and theorists in other modes, including the descriptive and even the narrative, but in few instances have education students been allowed to use alternative modes of discourse for academic purposes. Education students, along with most undergraduates, still assume that professors expect expository and argumentative writing in the objective voice.

Their perceptions are accurate. In a study of university education professors' expectations for student writing (Gambell, 1987), I found most professors demanded the argumentative mode. Professors believed their students wrote poorly, but when professors' meaning of poor writing was analyzed it amounted to students' inability successfully to come to grips with the mode of discourse demanded of the discipline and expected by professors. Yet these professors had not thought it necessary to teach students how to write in the mode of discourse valued in the discipline.

Crowhurst (1990) has argued for the teaching of persuasive/argumentative discourse during the elementary school years and beyond, for pupils have little opportunity for such writing although such modes are demanded in higher education. She maintains that children naturally use the argumentative mode, and that direct instruction should build upon that foundational language base. However, many educators fail to recognize that facility in the argumentative mode develops more in written discourse than in oral discourse. Oral argumentation is notably egocentric; oral argument makes a point of ignoring or turning aside counter-arguments and conflicting data. Although debating is oral argumentation, it usually occurs in the middle grades of schooling rather than during the elementary years. Written argumentation must take account of the opposing voice because written argumentation must assume a debate. It cannot afford to be single-minded else

it will be taken as hollow rhetoric. Likewise, expository writing must make allowance for its audience. In an earlier study (Gambell, 1987), I found professors cited students' failure to address the audience in argumentative discourse as a major weakness.

There have been numerous studies of undergraduate students' writing in the arts and sciences (Anderson et al., 1990; Flower & Hayes, 1980, 1981; Nelson, 1990) but little research on preservice education students' writing. It might well be argued that education students differ little if at all from other undergraduates in their writing ability or in their approach to or attitude to writing. But because teachers are language role models for students, and because teachers instruct students how to write, it is essential they know about the writing process and the relationship between writing, knowledge, and learning. Their self-perceptions of writing are vitally important; if teachers can reflect on their own writing, they may better understand their students' writing and help learners become more able writers.

Flower and Hayes (1981) developed a theory of the cognitive processes in writing to lay groundwork for more detailed study of thinking in writing. Their theory is based on protocol analyses over five years with undergraduate students. Flower and Hayes hypothesize that the art of writing has three major elements, the three units of their model: the task environment, the writer's long-term memory, and the writing "process." The task environment consists of the rhetorical problem (topic, audience, exigency) and the text produced so far. The writer's long-term memory consists of knowledge of topic, audience, and writing plans. The element of the writing "process" includes three components: planning (generating, organizing, goal setting), translating, and reviewing (evaluating and revising). I emphasize this third major element, the writing "process."

Nelson (1990) was interested in how 13 freshman students interpreted and responded to writing assignments in courses in a range of disciplines (sociology, engineering, literature). She reported her findings by discipline because she wanted to integrate interview data from professors with those from their students. Nelson concluded students relied on their individual resources, such as their past experiences with the subject matter of the course, past experiences with similar kinds of writing tasks, and what she called individual "production systems" or strategies for completing certain kinds of assignments. However, students differed in the extent to which they drew from these various sources (p. 388).

In the Anderson et al. (1990) study, five undergraduate students who scored highest on a university placement essay requirement formed a small research group to continue writing support for other courses they were taking, while collaborating on research about college-level writing. The five took courses in every undergraduate college, observing and recording teacher and student activities in classes involving language (primarily

writing), learning, and achieving. These five undergraduate students collectively found that except in meetings alone with teachers, they were evaluated only on the products of their independent work, not on their active participation in the course, or on their self-consciousness about language. They noted frequent conflicts between professors' and students' views of how language should be used to foster learning. Learning in lower-division, introductory courses was assumed by professors to be a private, competitive action (p. 17).

These students concluded that

an audience-centred approach should be taught as applicable not only to our writing, but to all of our language interactions in each course, whether student-to-student or student-to-teacher. Also, stressing applicable mechanical skills, such as note-taking, would be helpful. . . . help us clarify the value systems of the particular discourse communities in which our work is evaluated. (p. 27)

THE STUDY

Participants in this study were 48 elementary education preservice teachers in their second (mostly) or third year. Most were female. Students were registered in two sections of a compulsory English language arts methodology course which began in January 1989. On the second day of lectures I asked students to write detailed responses to eight questions. Each question was discussed with and among the students before they wrote individual responses to it. This process took up most of the class time. I wanted to collect this information at the outset of the course, before we got into the course topic of writing and the writing process. I did not want students to mediate existing writing practices or perceptions with new-found knowledge of writing and the writing process developed during the course.

Since I was grading these students, I ensured confidentiality of their responses.

Questions posed and discussed were:

1. How would you describe yourself as a writer? (Do you enjoy writing/find it onerous/find it easy or hard?)
2. What problems do you have with writing? Please be specific. (E.g., narrowing a topic, conceptualizing a topic, researching a topic, structuring an argument/paper, sentence structure, grammar, vocabulary, spelling.)
3. Do you proofread and edit papers before you hand them in? Explain.
4. Do you have others proofread and edit your papers before you hand them in? Explain.
5. Do you do one draft of a paper, or several drafts? Explain.
6. Do professors comment on your papers when they evaluate them? Explain.
7. Do you find professors' comments on papers useful? Explain.
8. General comments about your university writing.

FINDINGS

Writing: Enjoyable, Easy, or Difficult?

Most students (38) found writing enjoyable, though half found it difficult, the other half easy. Ten did not enjoy writing and found it difficult. Some students believed their writing was better organized, more fluent, and clearer than their oral articulation. In other words, they were more comfortable presenting their thoughts in writing than speaking in class. Such students had been rewarded for their writing but, on the other hand, felt inadequate speaking formally. Several mentioned being encouraged to write as children and that writing became a “hobby” for them. Others noted that “in the university setting writing skill is of paramount importance.”

Those who found writing difficult but enjoyable did not write well under pressure (such as with tight deadlines), disliked writing research papers (because they could not discuss their own opinions, ideas, or feelings), found it hard to move from the research to the writing stage (“problems getting the thoughts from my head to the paper”), and had trouble “finding the right words.” The difficulty of the expected mode of academic discourse, either exposition or argumentation (the research paper), may explain these responses. Students were unsure about vocabulary—should it be quoted and cited as subject-specific language, or should it be paraphrased language?—and how they should approach a topic that was assigned rather than self-selected and in which they had no particular interest.

Those who did not enjoy writing and found it difficult put off writing to the last minute. They relied heavily on the words of others (quotations), and found it hard to organize thoughts and ideas. Often they thought their own ideas had little merit.

One student put it this way:

At times I find it difficult to write, especially when it is about my own ideas, questions, and opinions. I have difficulty writing information papers from my own point of view in my own style after researching the topic. My paper usually ends up one big quote.

Problems with Writing

Since students identified more than one area of difficulty, the total exceeds 48. The most common problem (mentioned by 27 students) was selecting, refining, or narrowing a topic. Students found it difficult to put borders around their topics and to confine discussion to the topic as identified or defined.

I have problems narrowing down a topic and organizing all the info[r]mation together in a logical meaningful way. Usually my papers end up to be too vague because my topic was too broad. And my paper usually is mixed up.

Another major problem (20 students) was that of organizing a paper and structuring an argument. Students found it difficult deciding what information, from all they had accumulated, was relevant or important to their topic. This problem is essentially one of determining the audience for the paper. Students were unsure what the audience (the professor) knew, should know, or wanted to know. It is essentially an information guessing game on the part of the writer.

I find it hard to back up what I say and to expand what I've written. I assume that the reader has the same or higher previous knowledge of the topic as me.

The third-mentioned problem was researching a topic. Fourteen students said researching the topic was the most trying part of writing a paper. This problem is linked with the previous one, that of determining what information to gather and what to select for inclusion. Students felt that when they researched a topic they relied on others' ideas; that is, they were not confident (or competent) in challenging, or even thinking to challenge, those ideas. One student put it this way:

I have problems researching a topic because it seems that once I have read someone else's ideas I can't help but use them which forces me to source [sic] the writer.

Interestingly, mechanical aspects of the writing process were among the least-mentioned problems. Nine students mentioned grammar; eight, spelling and mechanics (punctuation); and six, sentence structure. Their comments on mechanical aspects showed these were usually identified by professors, rather than being a self-confessed difficulty. Two examples are:

I seem famous for "run-on sentences," not that I'm even sure what they are.

The biggest complaint that I receive on my papers is sloppy grammar.

One student saw a humorous side to this problem when he or she wrote that "me grammar and spelling aint da best either."

Proofreading and Editing: Self

Nearly half the respondents (23) stated they thoroughly and consistently proofread and edited their own papers before handing them in. However, 17 students who stated they did on subsequent analysis of written comments were shown to have misunderstood proofreading and editing. These 17 saw proofreading and editing as "a quick read-over" just before handing in the paper; some saw them as about spelling. The general vagueness comes through in this statement:

Yes, I reread to make sure that it is written in English and is understandable.

Seven students admitted to inconsistent editing and proofreading; sometimes they did them and sometimes not. Reasons converged on one of two rationales: insufficient time, and the limitations of proofreading and editing one's own writing. The latter rationale suggests a fairly well-reasoned idea of the role of the writer in the writing process. The most cogent comment was:

I try to proofread and edit papers to the best of my ability before I hand them in. By and large I find it difficult to proofread my work more than once or twice.

No student admitted to never proofreading or editing a paper.

Proofreading and Editing: Other

This question asked students to what extent, if any, they elicited others' help to proofread or to edit their papers; responses differed greatly from those to the previous question about self-editing and proofreading. Nearly half (23) of the students did not have other readers proofread and edit their papers because they were unaware of the benefits of doing so. Some had never thought about this possibility. But other reasons suggested that students decided not to have others read unfinished papers because they feared embarrassment over possible grammatical infelicities and failings. Yet another reason was students' wishes to take full credit for what they had written, and presumably for the high grade they expected. The competitive nature of academic writing shows here. The two very different perspectives are captured in students' statements:

No, it is my work and I want the mark I receive to be totally mine.

No, I don't like many people to read what I write. No matter what topic I write on, if I wrote it, it's private to me.

I do not get others to read my work because I get embarrassed. I do not want people to tell me my essay is useful or to lie about it, so I use my own judgment.

Nine students did have others read their papers, using "at least one friend" or "at least two people." An equal number were inconsistent in having others act as proofreaders and editors. Seven students did not understand that proofreading and editing could be performed by a person other than the writer, whereas three students said the question prompted their first consideration of having others proofread and edit one's writing.

Drafting: One or Several?

There was a clear split in responses to this question: 30 students said they wrote several drafts, and 18, one draft. However, of those who mentioned several drafts, some included point-form notes during the prewriting phase as a draft. These students saw drafting as including everything from one's first written notes through to the final copy. Writing teachers and researchers, however, separate what goes on during the prewriting phase from what occurs during the composing or drafting phase. One student described his or her process in these words:

Several drafts. First I take down important points, then I organize those points under different headings, then I put them into paragraphs (my rough copy). Then I put them in order.

Among those who relied on one draft of a paper, reasons usually involved time: students procrastinated writing a paper and had time for only one draft, or found multiple drafts too time-consuming. One student believed his/her paper deteriorated beyond a second copy, so wrote one draft, then made a final copy.

Professors' Comments

It was gratifying to discover that 22 students mentioned professors' written comments on their papers, and they appreciated such comments.¹ Students remarked that professorial comments were both positive and negative, and that the latter comments helped students to improve their writing. These students take such written comments seriously, learn from them, and realize that a mark alone, however gratifying, does not enable them to improve as writers.

Most professors do comment on the papers I write for them. Comments, as well as the mark itself are very useful to me. The more professors write for me, the more I feel I can learn from them.

However, 26 students believed professors' comments were inconsistent from one professor to another and that professors were not thorough enough in providing written feedback. Students were particularly upset when papers were returned with no written comment, merely a grade.

Students responded to this question in terms of their experience writing papers in all their university courses. In most cases, though, students did not compare disciplines or courses. The vagueness of professorial comments bothered some students.

I don't find their [professors'] comments very helpful because they are usually so vague, you don't know what it pertains to. For example, they may write "you lost track in the body of the report." Where??

Some of the many points raised in answers to the question about usefulness of professors' comments are worth reporting here, although they are minority views. Two students were displeased with professors who made only positive comments. They believed they could handle suggestions for improvement and change.

Four others noted that each professor has a different perspective on writing and that there was inconsistency among professors. To what extent this perception resulted from experiences in different disciplines was impossible to determine. Two students found professors' comments rude and insulting, or overly critical; five students wanted specific comments on their writing structures, organizational skills, and use of research. Some of those comments can be linked with vague comments by professors. One student wrote:

It is especially helpful if they [professors] tell me where I was clear or unclear in conveying my thoughts rather than commenting on the thought itself.

General Comments

Many respondents made numerous comments in this section, thus totals exceed the number of students (48). The comments reveal how students see their writing in light of the demands of academic discourse, and their desire for more writing during their academic lives.

Seventeen students described their realization of the role of academic writing in their university education. They recognized the relationship between language and thought and that writing serves to organize, clarify, extend, and communicate thought. They know, too, that through practice and feedback their writing will improve.

My writing has certainly grown over the year and a half that I have been here. Having to do university writing has opened my eyes. I now realize how important good writing skills are.

Twelve students wanted more choice of topics in their university writing. In comparison to other universities attended, wrote one student, "I am surprised at the limits of choice given to the students—i.e., essay choice is restricted to one or two topics." This respondent, like others, asks for opportunities to be creative not just in choice of topic but in selection of mode of discourse and audience addressed. One student expressed his/her feelings thus:

University writing tends, more than not, to reward opportunity and admonishes [sic] creativity. There are few professors who encourage originality and creativity. Those are the people who I enjoy writing for.

Five students believed the university discouraged writing. I see their view as closely linked with the outlook of those twelve students who decried the restrictive nature of university writing. Their dissatisfactions, however, arose for different reasons, such as having to write six essays in a three-hour final examination. These comments tell what students see as unrealistic writing demands.

Five students were critical of inconsistent and ambiguous standards among professors. I see this problem as an understandable consequence of various writing demands, stylistic expectations, and discourse traditions in different disciplines. When students take courses in a variety of disciplines they feel frustrated as they try to meet different discourse requirements. However, some students noted that professors sometimes didn't provide sufficient instruction on what they expected of students writing papers, nor did they provide information about how they graded papers.

Four students described what they saw as redundant and repetitive writing demands made by their professors, at least two of whom were in the college of education.

Four students commented they very much enjoy university writing and find it a "challenging" and "rewarding aspect of [their] university [life]." Some comments were difficult to categorize even in general terms; they vividly expressed some students' frustration and ambivalence about writing for university courses. Two such comments are:

I enjoy writing essays although my marks have dropped considerably in university on my papers. I find writing quite easy although it depends on the topic and whether I find the topic interesting or not.

I enjoy writing for myself. I hate writing an essay that will be critically picked apart by another person.

DISCUSSION

Despite what university professors or students say, university students in their second year (mostly) of a preservice elementary education program are not poor writers, reluctant writers, or unpractised writers, nor do they see themselves as such. However, many are frustrated and unsure of themselves as writers because of the writing demands made of them in university. I want to discuss this disjunction between the writing competence of students and expectations of academic writing in light of eight factors arising from this study.

The first is that of students' admitted reliance on the ideas and language of others and their suspension of critical judgment. Many students found researching a topic very difficult. Students believed they did not have the freedom critically to approach research, or lacked the skill to do so. Possibly they believe that to appear erudite means to be comprehensive rather than critical and selective. Nonetheless, their deference to subject experts is

widespread and often admitted. Students who called for freedom in selecting topics saw the importance of adopting a more critical role as researcher and writer.

Students were also unaware of the role of expressive language in the writing process. Expressive language (Britton, 1970; Pradl, 1982) explores, penetrates, and comes most readily when we wish to express an idea, thought, or feeling about a subject or experience. Expressive language is the undercurrent of free writing and expression. When expressive language is suppressed, however, writing can become stilted and barren, devoid of the writer's voice. When students feel uncomfortable with an assigned topic they suppress expressive thought and language and defer to the language and ideas of others. Students must be aware of the essential role of expressive language in the creation of at least the first draft of any paper.

Students suffer, too, from inability or unwillingness to conceptualize an audience. In my previous study of professors' perceptions of student writing (Gambell, 1987), I noted that professors were frustrated when students only envisioned one audience for their writing, namely their professors. Professors were discouraged by reading their own words in print. Students are also frustrated by the implied audience of professor for most writing assignments. Such frustration exacerbates their discomfort when researching a topic, and heightens their lack of ownership of essay topics. To break this restrictive cycle, professors might allow students greater freedom of topic choice, and provide opportunities to address audiences other than themselves.

The importance of ownership of writing topic was a major finding in Flower's and Hayes's (1980) study. They found that one hallmark of good writers was time spent thinking about how they wanted to affect a reader, whereas poor writers were by contrast tied to their topic. Students tied to a topic are also bound to experts on that topic. Being bound to an assigned topic might be less restrictive if students approached the topic from the perspective of the reader/audience, which would then enable them to define and limit the topic.

Writers have four intentions, according to Flower and Hayes (1980). These are:

1. The effect the writer wants to have on the reader.
2. The relationship the writer wishes to establish with the reader, the persona, projected self, or voice the writer wishes to create.
3. An attempt to build a coherent network of ideas, to create meaning.
4. Formal or conventional features of a written text. (p. 28)

Although the 48 student respondents stated these goals or purposes, they hesitated to identify a reader, even were it the professor, and to establish a rhetorical relationship with that reader. Students should define and address a reader/audience if they are to feel confident about and be successful in academic writing.

For students, writing in an expository or argumentative mode is often a guessing game. They are unsure which mode of discourse is preferred because they see no clearly defined purpose or audience in the writing task. The writing process as guessing game suggests interesting parallels with Kenneth Goodman's (1973) description of reading as a psycholinguistic guessing game where even good readers make miscues, and the nature of many miscues are predictable. Students too make miscues when writing for professors: they have difficulty selecting and/or narrowing a topic (27 out of 48), researching a topic (14/48), and organizing a paper with an argument (20/48). These writing misjudgments are predictable; professors, too, found these writing difficulties uppermost in student writing (Gambell, 1987).

Also predictable is that student self-perceived writing difficulties are rhetorical rather than grammatical. This finding is particularly useful because readers often misrepresent perceived writing problems as grammatical and syntactic (structural) when they are rhetorical (Harris & Witte, 1980). However, more students identified their own writing difficulties as rhetorical rather than grammatical. To solve this problem, professors should coach students in the mode of discourse dominant and expected in their discipline. My argument is that this factor constitutes a discipline-specific problem rather than a student-specific one.

This same plea was made by the five successful undergraduate writers in the Anderson et al. (1990) study when they asked professors to help them clarify the value systems of the particular discourse communities in which their written work was evaluated. These five students explicitly stated their belief that "students do need to know how to analyze and imitate the reading and writing they encounter in college" (p. 12). They see themselves as apprentice writers and readers of discipline-specific language, and the professor as the linguistic and rhetorical guide and mentor to and of the discourse community. Professors act as linguistic gatekeepers to their disciplines.

Inconsistency of professorial expectations for student writing is a difficult issue. Specialists must be free to pursue knowledge and frame understandings in the modes of discourse that members of their discipline choose, realizing that historical discourse precedents usually exist and imply a degree of conformity some members find overly restrictive. However, discourse communities shift, often because of new research directions. In education we see the inroads of ethnographic and other types of qualitative research on modes of discourse. If discourse communities are shifting, it is prudent, and academically honest, to apprise students of the numerous modes of discourse used in the discipline and to allow students to use a variety where applicable. If students are free to choose topics, they should also be free to adopt various modes of discourse.

Some student writing problems stem from propensity to delay writing papers to the last minute and thus be unable to use a process approach to writing even if familiar with it. Yet my experience in teaching a writing

course has been that students find it helpful when I sit with them in a writing conference and discuss in detail their first draft of an essay. Compared with other papers they often state that their mark on the final copy is higher as a result of the writing conference.

Most important, many students are unfamiliar with the various approaches to writing. True, they have their own approaches. However, many students were not aware of the value of peer or other reader revision strategies. Others felt too shy or intimidated to share their drafts with another reader. If these students could learn the value of expressive writing in early drafts, and develop a critical and objective perspective on their own writing, they could benefit from revision.

The model proposed by Flower and Hayes (1981), with its three major elements and numerous sub-elements, is worth sharing with students. If students use such a model to reflect on their own academic writing, they can begin to identify the goals and purposes necessary to succeed in academic writing. Inability to establish goals and purposes, or at least to be consciously aware of self-realized goals and purposes, characterized many of the 48 students in this study.

CONCLUSION

Among the issues I have raised, the competitive nature of academic writing deserves mention. Students in this study alluded to competition for grades through writing when they refused to have others proofread and edit their papers because they wanted the "ideas" to be solely their own. The five students in the Anderson et al. (1990) study found that professors assumed learning in their courses was "a private, competitive action" (p. 17). On what basis do students develop grade expectations for their written work and how do they rationalize not receiving the expected grade? My experience is that often students equate time spent on writing the paper with grade: the longer they spend writing, the higher the grade they anticipate.

There should be a balance between professorial guidance in writing assignments and student decision-making and goal-setting. Nelson (1990) warns that when tasks are tightly defined, students' approaches might be limited; "by providing overly explicit routines or procedures for accomplishing tasks, [professors] may allow students to use only a narrow range of cognitive processes" (p. 389). Research might help determine the optimum type and amount of guidance in writing tasks.

I see improvement of student writing in the academic university setting as a joint venture of students and professors. Students should rely more on each other as partners in writing than as competitors. Professors should make students aware of the discourse expectations of writing in their disciplines, while allowing students choice of topic and a variety of modes of discourse. Improved student writing serves the whole academic community well, and makes professors' work easier and more rewarding.

NOTE

- ¹ I here combine responses to questions 6 and 7, both of which dealt with the written comments of professors.

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Creative Dance in Elementary Schools: A Theoretical and Practical Justification

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This article presents a theoretical and practical justification for the inclusion of creative dance in the elementary school curriculum, using findings of a study in which I examined the effects of six creative-dance workshops on elementary school teachers' attitudes to and practices of creative dance. The study found that teachers' attitudes and practices changed as a result of the workshops and that children enjoy and benefit from creative-dance activities. Teachers' reflections on their experiences show that creative dance has a vital role in the elementary school curriculum and illustrate the close relationship between theoretical and practical aspects of creative dance.

Cet article présente une justification théorique et pratique de l'intégration au programme du primaire de l'expression corporelle, justification faisant appel aux conclusions d'une étude dans laquelle l'auteur se penche sur les effets de six ateliers d'expression corporelle sur les attitudes des enseignants au primaire à l'égard de l'expression corporelle et sur les pratiques de ceux-ci en la matière. L'étude révèle que les attitudes et les pratiques des enseignants changent à la suite de ces ateliers et que les enfants prennent plaisir à ces activités et en tirent parti. Les réflexions des enseignants sur leurs expériences indiquent que l'expression corporelle a un rôle clé à jouer au primaire et illustrent les rapports étroits qui peuvent être établis entre les aspects théoriques et pratiques de l'expression corporelle.

CREATIVE DANCE: A DEFINITION

In this article, *creative dance* refers to bodily activities that express inner thoughts and feelings and enhance those thoughts and feelings. This art form emphasizes creativity, problem solving, and the expression of thoughts and feelings. It involves participants physically, emotionally, and intellectually, uses techniques from other dance forms, and is non-threatening and non-competitive, recognizing and encouraging individual differences while challenging participants to improve physical skill and aesthetic expression.

THEORETICAL IMPORTANCE

Creative dance is of extensive value and importance to children (Best, 1985; Courtney, 1982; Riley, 1984; Silver, 1981). Children's feelings in dance are

particular to and inseparable from that art form (Best, 1985). Only those children who have experienced creative dance can appreciate its physical, intellectual, and emotional impact, since physical movements are external representations of internal events. Because these movements could not take place without inner experience, the inner experience cannot be denied.

Creative dance helps children explore their views on life issues, on the human condition, and on their own condition. As Best (1985) states, "If faced with integrity, experiences in life are perplexingly heterogeneous and serious involvement with the arts helps us realize this" (p. 192). A similar view is expressed in a dance instructor's recollection of a child's perception:

Dance Instructor: What are you saying in this dance?
 Child: Well you see, Miss, I'm married to her, and she's married to him. And she leaves him for me, and I leave her for her. But it all works out in the end.
 Dance Instructor: Does it always work out in the end?
 Child: [Pause.] No. . . . No, it doesn't.
 (Dance instructor's recollection of an exchange with a young student, presented in *The Child as the Creator*, a video-tape made at the "Dance and the Child Conference," University of Alberta, Edmonton, 1978)

Creative dance may facilitate children's personal development, showing them how situations have a number of meanings, encouraging experimental solutions of problems, and inviting acceptance or rejection of one another's ideas (Boorman, 1973; D'Houbler, 1957; Duncan, 1969; Riley, 1984). Creative dance may also be integrated with other subjects, since it is a generalizable method of learning (Gardner, 1985; Mac Donald, 1991, in press).

Creative Dance and the Concept of the Whole Child

Holistic curricula emphasize the relationship between the mind and body with a view to sensing the *connection* between them. Miller (1988), for example, finds appealing the vision of an interconnected universe of which we are a part. He advocates harmony between the child's inner world (thoughts, feelings, beliefs, judgments, and so on) and outer world (movements and behaviours), and supports creative dance as a method of facilitating this balance. Miller thus endorses the assumption underlying this article, namely, that creative dance is more than physical, involving our whole being.

A holistic view of dance was forcefully promoted as long ago as the early part of this century. In the early 1900s, Isadora Duncan developed dance methods that encouraged a connection between the dancer's outer movements and inner feelings. Duncan stressed that the dance should not be an end in itself, but rather an outward result of inward awareness. Eva Le Gallienne has elaborated Duncan's ideas:

The dance was not merely an art to [Duncan], but was part of her very being; she was obliged to dance, as we are obliged to breathe. There was to her no difference between dancing and living. She felt that through the dance one became inseparably a part of the great rhythm of the Universe, and that the harmony between Self and centre of being resulted as a matter of course in harmonious living. [quoted in Duncan (1969), p. 41]

In Dimonstein's (1971) recent holistic approach to dance for elementary school classrooms, the body is the centre, and children learn to express their feelings as they develop awareness of their muscles. As Miller (1988) puts it, "As we center ourselves and deepen our inner life, we find we have more internal resources to work with the physical, emotional, and spiritual needs of the developing child" (p. ix).

In a curriculum espousing holism, creativity would be of paramount importance in all subjects, the arts would be integrated into all core subjects, and creative dance would have an integral place in the curriculum. For example, mathematical fractions might be taught by rhythmic chanting and movement, poems interpreted through creative dance, or the meaning of the planets, and their positions in the universe instilled by creating dances.

In sum, creative dance can help children reach their full potential, for it encourages the development of *the whole child* by involving the child physically, emotionally, and intellectually, and thus enhancing creative exploration and facilitating emotional expression. Moreover, if children feel good about their bodies and their movements, and if these outward expressions help children realize and interpret their inner feelings through the medium of the body, *everything they do* will be affected.

PRACTICAL IMPORTANCE

Introduction

This section presents research findings on the practical importance of creative dance. These findings are drawn from a study (Mac Donald, 1989) whose purpose was to determine whether elementary school teachers' attitudes to and practices of creative dance would change through workshop intervention.

Research Design

I selected case-study subjects from a larger group of 20 teachers teaching junior kindergarten, kindergarten, or grades 1, 2, or 3. All had taught at these levels for at least one year, and none was currently teaching creative dance as the term is defined here. Subjects were recruited in university courses, practice-teaching sessions, and professional development workshops.

All teachers participated in a pre-workshop interview. Interview questions emphasized teachers' attitudes to and practices of creative dance, and their intentions, beliefs, anxieties, and needs in dance teachings. After pre-workshop interviews, I selected case-study subjects on the following criteria:

- that junior kindergarten, kindergarten, and grades 1, 2, and 3 be represented;
- that varying amounts of teaching experience be represented;
- that a variety of beliefs (traditional and non-traditional) about education be represented.

The eight case-study subjects I selected were: Chris, Donna, Gerry, Hanna, Katie, Nancy, Viola, and Wendy. There were two junior kindergarten teachers, one kindergarten teacher, one grade 1 teacher, three grade 2 teachers, and one grade 3 teacher. Three case-study subjects taught split grades: grades 1 and 2 for two case-study subjects, grades 2 and 3 for the third. Teaching experience ranged from 4 to 27 years, and the average number of years taught was 11.7.

Workshop intervention took place in teachers' schools and consisted of six three-hour workshops held approximately one week apart. Teachers were active participants during all six workshops and were given opportunities to experiment with and to explore suggested creative-dance methods and practices. Teachers were encouraged to implement workshop ideas in their classrooms between workshops and to write about these experiences in journals. At the beginning of each workshop, teachers discussed the teaching of creative dance and received answers to their questions. The entire workshop series emphasized creative-dance skills teachers can use to enhance lessons in mathematics, science, language, and other content areas.

The workshops also included practical plans on how to start, develop, and integrate creative-dance programs. For instance, I wrote mathematics problems (addition and subtraction problems are recommended for grades 1 and 2, multiplication and division for the higher grades) on large cards randomly positioned on the gymnasium floor. I played music, and teachers moved to it in various creative ways: punching, walking on their heels, moving their arms, and so on. When the music stopped, teachers chose one of the cards on the floor, solved the corresponding mathematics problem, and then made any body shape in which the number of body parts touching the floor equalled their answer. As a variation, teachers chose a card when the music stopped, solved the problem, and then gathered the number of people needed co-operatively to make any body shape matching the answer to the problem. The workshops also included basic dance theory and practical ideas, such as body shapes, body levels, focus, transitions, floor patterns, locomotion and transfer of weight, flight and elevation, group work, and dancing with props or to different sounds.

Case-study subjects were asked to keep personal journals during the workshop series and to record their opinions of the content of the workshop series, their intentions as to implementation of workshop content, and

changes in their attitudes to and practices of creative dance. I encouraged case-study subjects to make journal entries during their classroom activities, and during and between two observation visits. I collected the journals after the second observation visit, and used their content to supplement pre-workshop findings, observations during the workshop series and in case-study subjects' classrooms, and information I gathered during the post-workshop interview.

I made two observation visits to each case-study subject's school. My purpose was threefold: to establish the relationship between teachers' reported and actual practices, to determine whether there was any relationship between teachers' practices and the workshops' content, and to act as a trouble-shooter—to identify problems, to help solve them, and to provide advice and additional support.

Four months after the end of the workshop series, case-study subjects were interviewed a second time. The purpose of this post-workshop interview was to establish teachers' reported attitudes to and practices regarding the teaching of creative dance; to assess whether the workshops had a long-term effect on these attitudes and practices; and to determine why changes occurred or failed to occur. Interview questions asked case-study subjects about their attitudes, practices, anxieties, beliefs, intentions, and needs concerning the teaching of creative dance.

Research Findings

Research findings from interviews, journals, and my field notes show that the practical importance of creative dance takes three main forms: children enjoy and benefit from creative-dance activities and are therefore enthusiastic about learning through this art form; creative dance may be used as an alternative, integrative method of teaching; and creative dance can enhance whole child development.

One of the most significant findings of this study was children's overwhelmingly positive response to creative dance. For example, in her post-workshop interview, Wendy reported: "I tried it with the children and they loved it" (Mac Donald, 1989, p. 125). Similarly, during her first observation visit, Chris reported, "The children love it! They just love it! They ask for it!" (Mac Donald, 1989, p. 74).

Teachers reported in workshops, journal writings, and observation visits that children responded to creative dance with an intensity, concentration, "ownership," and enthusiasm they did not usually see in children's educational activities.

One girl in particular, who is very creative in art but generally restless and very active, concentrated so intensely that she was oblivious to the rest of the class. I watched as she manipulated her hoop, trying one position, rejecting it, trying another until it suited her, and then she froze. (Mac Donald, 1989, pp. 72–73)

After the workshops, I arranged with individual case-study subjects to meet and to observe their teaching of creative dance. During these observation visits, I, too, noted children's positive responses in creative dance:

Donna was so impressed with her children's creative-dance efforts that she had one child run back to the portable to get her camera so that she could photograph their work. Donna's children reacted very positively toward creative dance, and the children's enthusiasm seemed to affect Donna and make her even more enthusiastic. . . . All the children appeared to enjoy the freedom to move, express themselves, and work on something on their own. The children appeared to be having fun. They were concentrating, excited, laughing, smiling, and enthusiastic. (Donna's observation report 2; Mac Donald, 1989, p. 78)

In post-workshop interviews and in their journals, teachers reported on their use of creative dance as an alternative, integrative method of teaching. Teachers discovered it was relatively easy to incorporate creative dance into many areas of the curriculum, were astonished at the possibilities it offered, and even commented that it changed their entire perspective:

I enjoyed the practical examples used showing how creative dance can be integrated. . . . I can see endless possibilities with these activities and realize now how easy it would be to incorporate creative dance in many areas of the curriculum. . . . After the workshop series, everything just took on a new perspective. By using creative dance as a method of instruction, to teach the alphabet, to teach language, arts, and math, everything is more integrated. (Hanna's post-workshop interview; Mac Donald, 1989, pp. 87-90)

Similarly, Katie found she could use creative dance to enhance her program: "I integrate creative dance, sometimes using it to enhance other disciplines and other times as a lesson on its own. It depends on the needs of the children. They love it, and so do I!" (p. 93).

Moreover, both the teachers and I noted that using creative dance as an alternative, integrative method of teaching facilitated development of the whole child. Children tremendously enjoyed the challenge of simultaneously solving problems, collaborating and socializing with their peers, and expressing themselves physically. As a result, children became more enthusiastic about learning in general and individual subject areas in particular:

The next activity Wendy did involved integrating creative dance and math and was an adaptation of an activity presented in the workshop series. When Wendy pulled out her cards with math equations on them, one child asked, "Oh, are there any times?" Wendy replied, "Yes, there are times; plus there are take-aways." . . . The Grade 2s were to choose multiplication problems; the Grade 1s, subtraction problems. . . . The children were busy thinking. You could see them counting on their fingers to figure out the answer. . . . Wendy extended the math activity by encouraging the children to work in partners. . . . This challenged the children more physically, and they seemed to enjoy the social aspect. They

laughed, smiled, and were enthusiastic about working with their friends. (Wendy's observation report 2; Mac Donald, 1989, pp. 113–114)

During my observation visits, I was able to confirm case-study subjects' journal reports about their experiences with creative dance. For example:

Chris was teaching creative dance according to my definition. Her activities involved the development of the whole child. They were physically challenged, encouraged to think, be creative, explore, and problem-solve, and they worked in social peer groups. She incorporated many of the ideas presented in the workshop series which she attended. Furthermore, she adapted many of these ideas to suit the needs of her class. Chris seemed to have taken ownership of the content. (Mac Donald, 1989, p. 72)

THE DIALECTIC BETWEEN THEORY AND PRACTICE

The three main findings on the practical importance of creative dance in the elementary school curriculum have a theoretical basis. Creative dance makes learning more fun for children, helps to integrate and to enhance existing programs, and facilitates whole child development.

Children's enjoyment of dance is consistent with Best's (1985) view that creative dance provides an opportunity for children to experience the human condition and *their* condition, to communicate, share ideas, socialize with peers, and increase their self-confidence. My findings on integration and enhancement are consistent with the views of D'Houbler (1957), Boorman (1973), Riley (1984), and Gardner (1985).

Teachers realized creative dance could be used as a vehicle for enhancing children's physical, emotional, and intellectual development. They agreed that creative dance facilitates the development of the whole child, by creating harmony and balance between the child's inner and outer worlds. These findings support the position of Courtney (1982) and Miller (1988), that dance is an appropriate method for developing the whole child.

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The Security of the Child's World

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This study describes common situations where children perceive risk and where we, as adults responsible for them, can lend a sense of security to their explorations. I first discuss the texture of risk in children's everyday lives, then indicate how adults can influence this texture of risk by supporting, guiding, and instructing. These are lesser modes of pedagogic presence than are challenging and encountering children if we wish to establish the security of the child's world. Phenomenological description of these various modes shows how children can learn to become responsible for the risks they face and acquire a sense of security that makes certain risks worth taking.

Cette étude décrit des situations courantes dans lesquelles les enfants perçoivent un risque et où nous, en tant qu'adultes responsables de ces enfants, pouvons les rassurer dans leurs explorations. L'auteur discute d'abord de la nature du risque dans le quotidien des enfants, puis indique comment les adultes peuvent intervenir auprès de ceux-ci par leur soutien, leurs conseils et leur enseignement. Il s'agit là, pour qui veut sécuriser l'enfant, de meilleurs modes de présence pédagogique que le fait de le confronter ou de lui lancer des défis. La description phénoménologique de ces divers modes de présence révèle comment les enfants peuvent apprendre à se responsabiliser par rapport aux risques auxquels ils font face et acquérir un sentiment de sécurité qui les incite à considérer qu'il vaut la peine de prendre certains risques.

Latch-key children, sexually abused children, children from dysfunctional homes, abducted children, children in homeless families, street children—all live in a risky and dangerous world. Other children not facing such unfortunate conditions may yet become aware of risk and danger. If left completely to themselves, or if by our actions we disregard their fears and difficulties, children may find themselves exposed to risk.

What are we to do about the security of the child's world? How might those responsible for the care of children ensure that they grow up sensing the security necessary for their growth and development? Bowlby (1969; 1973; 1980) and subsequent researchers (Ainsworth, Mahler, Sroufe, Winnicott) show how a sense of security can be cultivated. Two main sets of influences contribute to a child's sense of security, namely, the influence of a trustworthy person who can "provide the kind of secure base required at each phase of the life-cycle," and the capacity of another individual to respond in a trusting manner and "to collaborate with that person in such a way that a mutually rewarding relationship is initiated and maintained" (Bowlby,

1979, p. 104). Security comes from being cared for by the mother or the father, and such feelings of security normally allow other adults to take the place of the parent and other places to draw the child beyond the safety of the home. Thus the child comes to explore the world in untroubled security.

But the question of the security of the child's world takes us beyond attachment theory. First, although it requires us to consider the need for attachment to one or more specially loved adults, it stresses the responsibility adults share for ensuring the conditions of children's security. Second, it is a pedagogical question how things ought to be for children, rather than a psychological question why things are as they seem to be for many children. And third, the question of the security of the child's world has to do with the trust, reliance, and self-reliance exhibited in adult-child interactions, but also with the grounds for being able to respond to children. In other words, it requires attentiveness to the conditions that give rise to a child's sense of security in particular situations of risk.

Böllnow wrote of a "pedagogical atmosphere" that could bring a sense of security to childhood exploration. He said:

Only in an atmosphere of security can the child grow in the right direction and only in this medium does the world reveal itself to the child in all its reasonable order. Should this security be missing, then the world remains a shocking, threatening power. And if this sense of security is not guaranteed elsewhere, then the child is refused the will to life, and he or she withers emotionally. (Böllnow, 1970/1989, p. 12)

Genuine pedagogy carefully meets and transcends risks by creating an atmosphere of security. It does not proceed wholly blind to risks nor neurotically exaggerate them, but establishes an atmosphere wherein clear and distinct instances of risk can be experienced. Practically speaking, this means creating places between the home and the world—playgrounds, neighbourhoods, and schools—where children can feel secure and where they can, in due course, venture into an otherwise threatening world. Pedagogically speaking, it means responding to children's difficulties, becoming sensitive to their fears, building upon the trust earlier "invested in a single person [and] now . . . become a more generalized trust in the world" (p. 17; cf. van Manen, 1991, pp. 6, 55–58). We look for situations where responsiveness to children's concerns engenders an atmosphere of security sustaining their movement toward greater independence.

THE TEXTURE OF RISK

Let us first consider everyday examples, events of daily life, "small events that are likely to happen in any child's day and that need to be handled as they occur" (Bettelheim, 1962, p. 27). Taken together these events add up to "a good life or a pretty miserable one" (p. 28).

I think of a three-year-old boy wandering the streets near my house. He happily joins the children in our communal playground. Still, I am concerned that his parents may not know his whereabouts. I have him take me to his home to reassure them of his safety. "Don't worry," Stephen's parents tell me, "he knows his way around." I feel a little foolish, not so much for interfering as for being unnecessarily concerned. And yet the response of these parents, who greet me as reasonable people, does not put to rest my concern. Is it desirable to let a three-year-old child find his way around? Their faith in the little boy's capacity to look after himself actually increases my concern, especially when they come knocking on my door long after dark, asking if I have seen their son of late, or if I see him, would I please send him home.

How should I respond? Vandenberg wrote of the obligation we have to help such a child by ensuring his safety as we structure his world "in proportion to his helplessness" and liberate him "for his own possibilities in the world of play" (Vandenberg, 1971, p. 64). By making himself known Stephen obliges me to respond in some measure to the risky texture of his life. Should I leave him alone? Should I take him to his home? Should I follow him to where the other children are playing and monitor his movements in the absence of his parents? Should I stay nearby to ensure that, for now, he is being watched over? These questions call for a *personal* response.

Now you might think this situation is a little out of the ordinary. Consider, then, how the texture of risk and questions of our responsiveness to it are apparent even in the most common of family practices. My son, Tyler, asks one evening: "How come [my sister] sleeps in your room and you get to sleep with Mommy, but I don't have anyone to sleep with?" Is it any wonder that fears arise when in our efforts to do something *for* children (such as providing them with a room of their own) we overlook what we do *to* them and to their sense of security. We leave children at home with a babysitter while we take a well-earned vacation, we drop children off at so-called "parent-free" classes for swimming and gymnastics, and we sign them up for "day-camp" programs as soon as their day care and kindergarten programs go into recess. In situations of parental absence, the risks of everyday life easily become dangers; and to compound things, we give others the job of "educating" our children about the world's dangers and "teaching" them how to defend themselves. Through the rationalization of children's lives we may easily deny our adult responsibility for ensuring the security of their world.

We must be clear what is at stake. I do not wish to conclude from these examples that we do children great harm by leaving them alone. In spite of the dangers portrayed in a recent cinema version of a child being left "home alone," Bettelheim has shown that sometimes the apparent "abandonment" of children is a means to their gaining a sense of independence and personal responsibility for their lives. He said:

The child of school age cannot yet believe that he ever will be able to meet the world without his parents; that is why he wishes to hold on to them beyond the necessary point. He needs to learn that someday he will master the dangers of the world, even in the exaggerated form in which his fears depict them, and be enriched by it. (Bettelheim, 1975, p. 166)

More importantly, there comes a time when children will want to be left alone, when they will want to sleep by themselves, and when they will need to be trusted to explore the neighbourhood unaccompanied by their parents. Before this time it may be appropriate to speak of abandonment, but when children express a desire to venture out on their own a much greater disservice may be done by keeping them in protective custody. If we ignore the moment, rather than bringing a sense of security to children's activity, our presence confines it and taints it with a distrust of the world. The lesson received is that the world is to be feared except when adults are present. By drawing attention to the texture of risk in this manner we deny the very movement toward maturity which prefigures our pedagogic relation to children.

Let us now look more closely at how this texture of risk is modulated not only by the extremes of presence or absence, but more particularly, by certain modes of presence of the adult to the child. Let us see how this texture of risk is softened by surrounding children's actions in an atmosphere of security. After all, atmosphere is not only "the way in which space is lived and experienced. But atmosphere is also the way a teacher is present to children, and the way children are present to the teacher" (van Manen, 1986, p. 36). Atmosphere is affected by the ways in which adults are present for the sake of children's explorations.

THE PRESENCE OF ADULTS

A risky situation that stays with me involves taking upper elementary children on a climbing expedition. We are preparing to climb a mountain. For the past few days we have engaged the forty or so children in environmental studies, rock climbing, orienteering, canoeing, and bush-craft activities; throughout each activity we have spoken of the early explorers of this area, the routes they took, and the settlements they established. And all the while Mount Maroon stares down us. Some sketch it, some photograph it, others find faces and forms within it—each anticipating in his or her own way the climb.

The climb up Mount Maroon is not overly taxing. Some sections require ropes, but for the most part it is a five-hour hike and scramble to the top. Nevertheless there is air of uncertainty from the outset. Many of the children seem nervous, and one of them, Chris, is absolutely afraid. Her determination to reach the top is threatened by the fear she has for her safety. Each step pulls her away from where she feels comfortable. The glazed look in her eyes suggests a desire to be anywhere else than where she is now. Her

tentative gropings, her clinging stops, indicate to us that Chris is overpowered by a sense of danger which prevents her from seeing very much at all. Even on the descent, when generally the worst is behind, she still sees danger. She winds her way down, crab-like, unaware of the levelling terrain, unaware of the others who stay with her talking all the while about school, home, and familiar things, and unaware that the seat of her pants will soon wear out. "Not far to go now, Chris. . . . I wonder what the others are doing. . . . Do you think they might be at the bottom yet?" "You're doing really well. This will certainly be something to tell the folks at home about. . . . Hang in there, there's not much farther to go." Chris maintains her posture of fear in spite of, and perhaps because of, the advances of those around her. Their words provide little comfort because they refer to her thoughts of danger and the fear she has for her safety.

It may not be too hard to find all sorts of reasons for this child's fearfulness—prior experiences, a complete lack of self-confidence, an inability to trust others—yet the inescapable fact is that this child is cut off from us. Although her body sends messages to those around her who can offer safety, and although we intend to be there for her, Chris feels marooned. Our actions do not help Chris to take a risk. Our support only exacerbates the situation. "It tries to substitute 'good' feelings for unacceptable ones, to deny the reality of them, or to distract the child. The message the child receives is, 'You shouldn't feel the way you do'" (Snyder, Snyder, & Snyder, 1980, p. 171). So, how should this child be helped? Perhaps we need to turn back the clock to an earlier time in Chris's life, when the texture of risk did not rub so abrasively.

I am playing with a much younger Chris at Lansdowne Playground. She spends her time clambering over decks, climbing ladders and bars, and coming down the small slides; however, she avoids the larger spiralling slide at the farther end of the playground. "I bet you can't come down that one," I say, thinking that the slide's location explains why she has left it alone so far. But my words come as a dare that shows in the cautious way she climbs the steps to the top. Chris calls from the top: "You come down with me!" And having played on the other equipment with her it seems natural to do as she asks. Yet, surprisingly, this child still does not want to come down the slide; instead she comes back down the staircase. "What's the matter?" I ask, thinking of slides twice as high from which I can't keep her away. My question is also tinged with a sense of guilt at having put her in a situation where she had to back down. I press harder: "Why don't you want to come down the slide with *me*?" to which Chris answers, "I'll be upside down." And so I look again at the slide noticing how the protective casing makes it appear to be a tunnel in which one might conceivably turn upside down. Still, I am not satisfied. I have understood the reason Chris gave me but the question of why she would not come down with me remains. Was I wrong to dare her? How might I have encouraged her efforts? Perhaps my *guidance* left too little room for Chris to make her own way. Maybe her

response is meant as something for me to think about, a response that might stop me from bothering her as she tries to come to terms with the challenge of the slide. Or could it be that Chris wants me to be with her in a different way? Perhaps she wants less guidance and more encouragement for the risk she would like to take.

That is the case for some children on another playground. I see three of them of different ages mounting the ladder that leads up to the top of an unusually high slippery slide, one which is probably twice as high as they have seen before. These three chatter among themselves, although from a distance I cannot recognize the gist of their talk. It is possible they are worried about being up so high. But they are not as worried as their mother, who comes running over to them. She calls to them: "Now, how do you think you're going to get down?" She moves even closer so that the children appear to hang directly over her. "I told you not to go up there!" The three children stand rigid, grasping tightly the rails of the ladder. The youngest one starts calling for his mother to come and get him, at which point she reluctantly begins to climb the ladder. As she moves closer she sees that this youngest child is quite fearful. She says, in an attempt to reassure him, "Just stay still, Chrissy, Mommy's scared too." She climbs up to grasp this youngest child and then all four come back down the ladder, quite relieved to be safely on the ground. "I don't want to see any of you going near that slide again," she admonishes them as the children run off to the nearby swings. And as they run off I wonder about the risk of climbing this slide. Where was the danger and what was the source of the children's fear? What was the nature of this parent's concern? She ensured their physical safety, but what did she do for their sense of security? How were these children helped by their mother being there on the playground?

The mother of these three children might stop and reflect upon her own sense of risk and danger. The situation changes for the worse as soon as she arrives on the scene and starts berating her three children. They evidently feel her concern, and with her there, the slide turns into a dangerous thing. This situation is not unlike many others where an adult imposes a sense of normative order on children's activity. *Instructing* the child, the adult tells the child what to do and what to feel about his or her activity. "Instructing a child insinuates that she is not capable of thinking for herself and that she needs an adult to take over. Hence the child becomes weaker, and she may learn to depend on someone else's thinking" (Snyder et al., 1980, p. 170). Of course, instruction has its place, but in the above situation it overlooks the child's place.

Children need help to feel secure in the face of risk. I see my child is afraid to come down the slide. What do I do? Do I cajole him to come down? Am I content to support, guide, and instruct him? I may be tempted to say: "Look at Jamie. See, *he* can do it. You can do it too." But I know this dare may not work. I know how high this slide is for a child. The world looks so far below. And the metal steps are only a precarious connection

between the high platform and the safe ground below. I have been a child and I know this fear. So what do I do? I help my child by being with him in such a way that risks are seen where, without my help, danger might lurk. I help, not so much by looking out for the child's safety, as by caring sufficiently that his explorations can be carried out with an underlying sense of security. Within this perspective I am up there on the slide with the child. Though standing below with outstretched arms and requesting my son to "be careful," in the spirit of the moment I revel with the child in the activity at hand. He takes me up there with him, and in knowing I am there, the activity feels secure. "Watch me, Dad! Watch me!" the child says as he begins to climb the ladder. Part way up he cries: "Are you watching?" Is this a question or a plea? There is a degree of apprehension in this child's voice. He calls again with greater urgency. "Are you watching?" And with a reassuring nod he reaches the top. This child has nothing to show off but himself. He does not necessarily ask that I watch what he can do as if intent on giving a performance. No, the child may only want to feel the security of a protective gaze and to know that he is not alone. This cold metal structure needs a parental warmth.

If the child then becomes anxious on the slide we ought not be unduly concerned, since this anxiety is part of the child's coming to know the world in his or her own way. The child finds distance between the present context of activity and the world he or she knows. A risk is seen in shadowy outline. Our adult obligation, however, is to ensure that this anxiety does not separate the child from the things that are known, and in particular, from us. For example, I recall my child earlier refusing to come down the slide by himself, and I remember his plea that I come down with him. On that occasion I climbed the ladder behind him, and with him nestling against me, plummeted down the slide. "Do it again," he pleaded until the time came when he wanted to try it all by himself. Similarly, we think of the child who will not go upstairs alone. Do we help this child by laughing at his or her fears? Or does our help require us to go up the stairs together and to stay with the child until he or she come to find the upstairs region increasingly familiar?

Langeveld said that "the child's helplessness makes an appeal to us. What will our answer be? It need not be given in words. It may suffice that we are there; our presence may be the guarantee of security" (Langeveld, 1975, p. 7). How should we be there for the child? Does it not depend on the child and on the occasion and on all sorts of factors that cannot be clearly specified and which, when discussed generally, sound like romantic platitudes? Perhaps we should listen to what the child says. "Help me up!" a young Chris calls out, not even looking for ways to pull herself up onto a climbing frame in the park. She wants a boost, a reassuring hand, in order to get started.

PEDAGOGIC PRESENCE

Too often risky situations put children at risk. Even well-intentioned efforts at times deny children that mode of adult presence that lends security to their explorations. In a children's story called *Michael is Brave* (Buckley, 1971), we find a child enticed up the ladder of a slide by a teacher who thought he could assist a little girl who was already stuck at the top. Michael obliges the teacher, yet with each step up the ladder he becomes increasingly afraid for himself. Once at the top his presence encourages the little girl to go down herself, but Michael is now alone to face a risky situation. The question we might ask of the teacher in this story is: How can she be responsible for both Michael and the little girl? Is it really a matter of Michael being brave in climbing up the ladder to help the other child, or does genuine pedagogy require greater sensitivity to the concerns of both children?

I suggest that being present pedagogically has to do with *challenging* the child with a mindfulness of how the child encounters the world (Smith, 1989). It has to do with seeing risk as the child may come to see it. For example, I see Carson standing above me on the platform at Alice's Playground. I see that, whereas before Carson was content to come down the slide that is attached to this platform, the "fireman's pole" situated off to the side has now caught his eye. I ask if he wants to try sliding down it. "No," he replies rather unconvincingly, thereby convincing me he must really want to try it. "Oh, I bet you could do that," I say as I move underneath him. "Reach out and grab the pole." Carson leans forward and commits himself. "Now jump onto the bar and I'll catch you at the bottom." This he does. He clings momentarily to the pole, then drops clumsily into my arms. "Do you think you can do it again?" I ask. No, once is enough. Carson wants to do other things.

Sometime later I am with Carson at Malmo Playground. I see him climb up to the platform from which a "fireman's pole" is anchored on either side. He moves to the one closest to where I sit on the concrete border of this playground and says: "Watch me go down the pole—with nobody helping me!" He leans forward and tentatively grasps the pole, falls against it with his body, hooks his legs around, and drops to the ground. "Did you see me?" he asks. "I'll do it again." He then calls to me to stand by him. "Why?" I ask. "Because I want you to. I want you to watch me." "But can't I see you from here?" I reply. Carson does not respond directly, he simply requests once again for me to "Come and stand over here." So I move closer and watch him slide down the pole in one motion. "Do you want to see me do it again?" he asks.

I wonder why I must stand so close. Is this another instance of a child being dependent upon adult signs of approval, or is it an occasion for further reflection on the difference between pedagogic and non-pedagogic modes of presence? Perhaps it is an occasion for reflection on our relation to the child

before us, of where we stand with this child, and on what basis, what common experiences, it is possible to stand close by. After all, as Crowe has remarked,

If we never feel even a twinge of apprehension at the unknown, or if we conveniently overlook the fact or have never faced up to it, the chances are that we shall be unreasonably hard on our children. The more we deny our own fears the less self-awareness and confidence we have—and the more likely it is that we shall be particularly hard on them, wanting them not only to be more confident than we are, but more confident than is reasonable or possible. (Crowe, 1984, p. 128)

We look closely at what children are doing and recall our own fears and trepidations. Observing them rekindles the sense of anxiety, along with the joy, spontaneity, and trust in the world, which we remember from childhood (cf. Smith, 1991).

On the basis of these recollections we see children become aware of the risks of their activity. We look at the hesitancy that attends their movements. We see them become fearful, even afraid. Children are done a grave disservice if we leave the matter there, for their fearfulness is related to our attempts to become mindful of them. In other words, it is insufficient to say that children become fearful if our observation explains away their actions and avoids the question of our responsibility for their state of mind; on the contrary, we imagine ourselves taking risks when we look at fearful children. We watch as they navigate between the familiar and the unknown, we share in their discoveries, and we share their failures. Their apprehension strikes at the heart of our concern for them, and as well, our becoming mindful of how the world appears to them.

We see the child as he or she courts fear in various ways. Carson swings on the low bars of the climbing frame; Chris controls her descent on the slide by going down on her stomach. A sense of security comes with these more tentative responses to this playground equipment. And with use the equipment becomes less distant and increasingly familiar. The child's fear of the distant and unknown becomes a questioning of both the world and his or her place within it. If we close our eyes to children's fears, there is the danger of them becoming truly afraid and incapable of taking a risk at all. We remember this from watching Chris on the slide when any admonishment served only as a provocation to which she was even less likely to respond. A dare to come down the slide only accentuates fear. We must simply wait for this child to see for herself what the slide involves. To do otherwise is to jeopardize this possibility of self-disclosure and turn attention to those possibilities that create a fearful state of mind.

Being present pedagogically thus requires that we fully *encounter* the riskiness of the child's activity. A young child on the end of a see-saw giggles each time we bounce her into the air and delights us with her happiness. She allows us to see things afresh and shows us a joy in being

alive. So we bounce her higher and higher, ever mindful of the limits of her trust. Yet this same child cries and clings to us when we put her on a mechanical donkey at the local shopping mall. She becomes terrified, later on, when we make her come with us on a climbing trip. This child asks us to attend to the lived meaning of her activity, to observe the relation that ameliorates the activity's potential for causing distress. And this child asks for something that all children ask for in some way or another: that we encounter the risky nature of her activity by being sensitive to her experiences.

AN ATMOSPHERE OF SECURITY

There are probably as many ways of being with children as there are adults and children, and even then these would vary according to time and circumstance. For heuristic purposes, however, as well as for the purpose of sketching a relation that is especially mindful of children's risk-taking, it has been useful to talk of certain ways of being with children, certain modes of presence such as supporting, guiding, and instructing, and to distinguish these from challenging and encountering the child as modes of pedagogic relation. We see nuances of the adult-child relation; the way adults respond to children's activity reveals the texture of risk.

Through reflective awareness of the responses we make and how it is that such responses are possible, we can bring a sense of security to the child's activity and thus create the desired "pedagogical atmosphere." Rephrasing Vandenberg's (1975) usage of this notion, the pedagogical atmosphere is determined by the dispositions children and adults show toward each other. These dispositions furnish the medium within which it is possible for adult and child to be open to one another and for them to be attuned to the possibilities of risk-taking that an activity affords. The pedagogical atmosphere is felt when adults and children enjoy activity together. Challenging the child, becoming mindful of how things appear to the child, and seeking to make of the child's activity a common encounter with risk, are the determinants of this pedagogic atmosphere. These are the atmospheric conditions of our responsibility for children and the dimensions of our thinking about how children can learn to become responsible for themselves as they move beyond us into a risky world.

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Book Reviews / Recensions

"It's Up to You": Women at UBC in the Early Years

By Lee Stewart

Vancouver: University of British Columbia Press, 1990. 176 pages

REVIEWED BY NICOLE NEATBY, UNIVERSITY OF MONTREAL

Lee Stewart's history of women at the University of British Columbia is remarkable on many fronts. It goes much beyond the "Early Years," taking us from 1915, date of the university's foundation, to the mid-1950s. It also analyzes the experience of a wide range of women at UBC, including administrators, faculty, alumni, and students. The author pays special attention to the contribution of "club women" devoted to "improv[ing] the status of women" (p. 23) through the agency of clubs and organizations. Although the University's Academic Women's Association published this work "to celebrate the 75th anniversary of UBC," it steers clear of the "hagiographic" pitfalls associated with commemorative publications. The author presents distinctive aspects of women's experience at UBC and integrates her findings into the wider picture of the history of women's higher education in Canada.

UBC was "the last provincial university founded in Canada . . . when presumably all controversy about women's presence in universities had subsided" (p. xi). In such circumstances, one might have expected women at UBC to have had an easier time than their pioneering sisters in becoming a part of the university community. Stewart shows how a university's open admission policies to women and its official commitment to women's higher education may mask prejudices and inequalities that make female students second-class citizens. Women at UBC occupied an ambiguous, often uncomfortable position, whether as faculty or as students, mainly because "the social climate . . . expressed uncertainty about the purposes of higher education for women" (p. 91). During the 1930s and 1940s many still wondered if university education was necessary for women, whose essential social role remained that of homemaker. Stewart reveals that this enduring feeling meant that, more often than not, throughout UBC's development, women's education was regarded as a luxury that might be curtailed to conserve resources (p. 9). Her findings document what several historians of women have noted in other fields of study: that a linear, progress-oriented, whiggish interpretation of women's experience falls short of the true story.

Stewart has chosen to write from the standpoint of women who played a role in “upholding and defining women’s place at the university” (p. 10). More specifically, she identifies “the issues that these women . . . interpreted as significant” (p. 10), the issues they felt “tested the university’s willingness to accept and welcome the participation of women in higher education” (p. 91), including requests for a specialized curriculum in Nursing and in Home Economics, a Dean of Women, and a Women’s Residence. Stewart has in fact made these requests into the major themes of her study. Thus, in each chapter we follow the way in which the male administration responded to a particular request, discovering the determining factors that eventually led to its implementation. It is much to the author’s credit that she successfully demonstrates the multiplicity of factors and influences instrumental in both delaying and promoting these women’s issues. She also assesses the impact of financial constraints imposed on the University by the Depression, the impact of the two world wars, the debate concerning the University’s increasingly “vocationally” oriented training, and the relations between British Columbia’s politicians and UBC authorities. However, Stewart makes it clear that in no case was the decision to implement the women’s requests motivated by a specific commitment on the part of the university administration to further or to improve the status of women’s higher education.

Thus, if UBC responded relatively quickly in opening a Department of Nursing (1919), making it “the first university in the British Empire to combine hospital training with a degree program” (p. 32), the author demonstrates how this achievement was more the result of growing public pressure for higher standards in public health and hospital care after the First World War than any concern for the advancement of women’s education and work. On the other hand, Home Economics courses were very late in finding a place in the UBC curriculum (1943). Although the long-standing financial problems of the University provide part of the explanation for this, Home Economics came low on the priority list of UBC’s Board of Governors. Contrary to Nursing, this female field of study was thought not to further “The interest of anyone other than women” (p. 64), and its mostly female supporters did not have the required influence to exert effective pressure.

It remains puzzling, however, that the text throughout should express dismay, not to say bitter disappointment, at the opportunistic decisions that decided the fate of “women’s issues” at UBC. All too often we are openly reminded that: “The victory for feminist policies was . . . tempered by the current need for administrative and political expediency”(p. 61)—as if this were a surprising outcome. Yet it’s hardly surprising the “powers that be” should not be overly concerned about promoting women’s education. Stewart’s analysis has not dispelled her initial high expectations for the treatment of women in a university established after the fight for the admission of women had everywhere else in Canada been won. The reader is also distracted by Stewart’s presentism. Her introduction and conclusion include such words as “feminist” and “equal,” loaded with subjective meanings.

These words would have benefited from more precise definitions because of their changing meanings over time and place.

Stewart makes effective use of available secondary literature. Her extensive and up-to-date bibliography on the history of women's higher education in Canada, the United States, and England is very good.

Her study convincingly confirms patterns of behaviour discovered elsewhere, as the last two chapters on female student life at UBC make strikingly clear. *"It's Up to You"* shows the value of examining female university students' experience over time.

*Women and Men in Education:
A National Survey of Gender Distribution in School Systems*

By Ruth Rees

Toronto: Canadian Education Association, 1990. 102 pages.

REVIEWED BY MARYANN AYIM, UNIVERSITY OF WESTERN ONTARIO

Ruth Rees's research indicates that although most provincial ministries or departments of education have affirmative action or employment equity policies, the ministries offer varying degrees of incentive to school boards for implementation of corresponding programs. School boards, on the other hand, exhibit varying degrees of alacrity in availing themselves of ministry support. Ontario boards have been particularly active in this regard; Rees notes that only the Ontario ministry established "targets to hire or promote women to positions of added responsibility within school boards" (p. 17). The target set for the year 2000 was a 50 percent representation of women in the roles of supervisory officer, principal, and assistant principal.

Among teachers' federations responding to Rees's request for information, the Federation of Women Teachers' Associations of Ontario (FWTAO)—the only federation composed exclusively of women elementary teachers—offered the most diversified programs for women. Their programs included courses to help women prepare for principalships and supervisory examinations, and training programs for women doing collective bargaining. Of responding federations, only the FWTAO indicated it had targets for the representation of women in positions of added responsibility. The FWTAO stated that its goal was to achieve a level of 70 percent women in the roles of principal and assistant principal in Ontario public elementary schools by the earliest date possible.

The FWTAO is by far the most active among provincial federations in promoting the achievement of higher levels of female participation in positions of added responsibility. Ontario school boards were also among the

most active in Canada in acquiring financial support for achieving gender equity. Provincial and ministry legislation on sex equity is as strong in Ontario as anywhere, and stronger than in most jurisdictions.

Yet this is not reflected in principalships in elementary schools. In fact, the percentage of women principals in Ontario elementary schools is the lowest for all jurisdictions providing data. Even Alberta, where the ministry comes out looking the weakest under Rees's analysis, has a higher percentage of women principals in their elementary school system—19 percent, as opposed to 17 percent. The Yukon and the Northwest Territories, which do not even have legislation at the territorial level on women's issues in education, have significantly higher percentages of women elementary school principals—38 percent and 27 percent respectively, as opposed to Ontario's 17 percent. Ontario women do achieve a much higher representation of assistant principals, however, and at the secondary school level, representation of both women principals and assistant principals is comparatively high.

The figures on principals, assistant principals, department heads, and chief executive officers are consistently low in all jurisdictions, showing we have not come a long way toward achieving gender equity in the ranks of school administration. Some figures are at first encouraging. For example, 35 percent of principalships in Nova Scotia elementary schools and 51 percent of assistant principalships in Quebec elementary schools are occupied by women. But they lose much of their lustre when put up against other statistics, for example, that 85 percent of the teaching roles in the Nova Scotia and Quebec elementary schools are occupied by women.

I am intrigued by the apparent discrepancy between ambitious and active federations and boards in Ontario, particularly at the elementary school level, and the surprisingly low representation of women as Ontario elementary school principals. Should these figures make us pessimistic about the impact of affirmative action policies and programs on power hierarchies in the real world? Are these very depressing figures what made gender equity a topic of first-order importance to the FWTAO? Is the much greater representation of women as elementary school assistant principals an outcome of the work of active federations and boards, and will this finally translate into a higher proportion of women principals? Why does Ontario fare so much better comparatively in the secondary school system?

My main disappointment with the book is that it provides no discussion, even speculative, about these and other interesting questions raised by comparative claims and statistics. Perhaps this constitutes another book, which one can only hope Rees might undertake to write. (A report examining the racial representation of teachers in Canada would also be a useful supplement to *Women and Men in Education*.)

Rees does make the vitally important distinction between "staff" and "line" positions, where the former offer very little power to change the system while the latter lead directly and clearly to positions of power and

control. Consultants and special education teachers are ranked in the former group. Rees reports that women constitute the majority of consultants in eight provinces and the majority of special education teachers in four of the five provinces that reported on this category (p. 89). The “line” positions include the roles of superintendent, principal, assistant principal, and so forth, and we already know what the gender distribution looks like here.

In conclusion, the gender break-downs for positions of added responsibility in the provinces and territories, although hard to compare across jurisdictions, are enormously useful for anyone interested in gender equity in the educational system. I would have liked to end my review by saying something cheerful, like “hopefully, all of us have an interest in the achievement of gender equity in the educational system”; unfortunately, *Women and Men in Education* does not give us grounds for such naïve optimism. The report’s great strength is that it tells us in unmistakable facts and figures exactly why such optimism remains naïve even as we move into the twenty-first century.

Women and Education: A Canadian Perspective

Edited by Jane Gaskell & Arlene McLaren

Calgary: Detselig Enterprises, 1987. vi + 398 pages.

Claiming an Education: Feminism and Canadian Schools

By Jane Gaskell, Arlene McLaren, & Myra Novogrodsky.

Toronto: Our Schools, Our Selves, 1989. iv + 128 pages.

REVIEWED BY NAOMI HERSOM

These books have been written by some of us about all of us. The authors, all women save two, are guided by the notion that feminism means reshaping policy and practice so that they clearly embody the experience of women and men. Jane Gaskell and her colleagues provide ample evidence and convincing argument in support of the feminist claim that inequalities in education persist despite improving accessibility to education for women and conscious efforts to eliminate stereotyping in school texts. Much remains to be done.

The broad range of research reported in *Women and Education* shows the situation facing women in almost every part of the educational field in

Canada. This breadth has been achieved in two ways. First, the papers, prepared originally for presentation at the Women and Education Conference held in 1986, were deliberately selected to be representative of social science work on education policy and practice in English Canada. Second, the collection of papers impressively illustrates the growth and maturity of feminist research in Canada. The editors provide extensive analyses, far more than the usual overview, in the introduction to each section. The editors include comprehensive reference lists that further enhance the collection as a resource for researchers investigating questions about women and education in Canada.

The papers deal with the roles of women as mothers, as teachers, and as students aspiring to post-secondary and other adult education opportunities. Some reveal curricula designed for the most part without taking into account the realities of women's lives, either in terms of content to be taught, or of the way content is organized and delivered. As I read these descriptions of women's experience in Canadian education, I was struck by their strong parallels with the radically different approaches in Grumet's *Bitter Milk* (1988) and in Delamont's *Knowledgeable Women* (1989), to name just two examples from the United States and the United Kingdom, respectively.

The papers' diversity contributes to both the strengths and the weaknesses of *Women and Education*. Because the collection represents a wide range of research, such a volume cannot help being uneven. Differences among the researchers' assumptions and perspectives challenge the reader. Stromquist (1990) for one has pointed out the importance of recognizing differences among the explanatory powers and the limitations of the liberal, radical, and feminist theoretical approaches often favoured by researchers. Readers researching specific topics, as well as those seeking a comprehensive picture of research on women in education in Canada, will have to take care to put the pieces in *Women and Education* into perspective—in this case, a worthwhile investment.

But the book is remarkably timely, too. It addresses the age-old question what knowledge is of most worth and does so, not only from a Canadian perspective, as the subtitle indicates, but also from the perspective of women's identification and pursuit of knowledge of worth. At the very heart of the book is Thelma McCormack's chapter on "Feminism, Women's Studies and the New Academic Freedom" (pp. 289–303). Today, as debate is being joined about the role and place of women's ideas in the curricula of the university and the schools, her insistence on the importance of defending the principle of academic freedom has special pertinence. The commitment to the right of dissent and to the right of access to the marketplace of ideas is as important today, she reminds us, as it was during the eighteenth-century struggle for religious freedom. Each of the four major sections of this book illustrates what it means to identify a body of knowledge that has its source in women's ideas and women's research, that shows how women experience our political and social culture, that illuminates omissions and disproportion-

tionate emphases in content and practice. In each case there is a clear reminder that all proposals to introduce new ways of thinking and to incorporate these in the content of the curriculum will be challenged. This book offers some compelling evidence in favour of making those changes.

Claiming an Education is quite a different treatment of the same developments. This slim volume is almost a precis of the larger work and thus useful, although not intended as a reference for researchers. It is an easily read, popularly written compendium based on ideas derived from the scholarly research so ably presented in *Women and Education*. For a quick read, I would recommend it to students and professors in teacher education programs as a thought-provoking basis for discussion of equity issues. If teachers and policy makers could deal in practice with the barriers women face in education at every level, then we would indeed see change in schooling. The strategies sketched in this book offer practical starting points for all who are actively engaged in developing curriculum, in teaching, and in administering schools. Gaskell and McLaren along with Novogrodsky in this publication, have achieved something researchers and academics often find difficult. They have presented the results of research in highly readable form and they have succeeded in grounding practical advice firmly on knowledge discovered through research.

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La recherche qualitative en éducation

Par Yves Poisson

Sillery: Les Presses de l'Université du Québec, 1990. 174 pages.

RECENSION PAR LORRAINE SAVOIE-ZAJE, UNIVERSITÉ DU QUÉBEC À HULL

Ce livre s'adresse à des étudiants désireux de se familiariser avec la recherche qualitative en général et l'approche ethnographique en particulier. Le texte constitue une bonne introduction aux divers concepts qu'une personne, au début d'un processus de recherche, devrait clarifier. L'auteur d'ailleurs énonce ses objectifs dès l'introduction alors qu'il écrit que l'information présentée cherche à fournir une perspective d'ensemble plutôt

que de développer en profondeur chacun des concepts. L'ouvrage comporte trois parties: présentation de la recherche qualitative; technique et pratique de la recherche qualitative; aspects de la formation à la recherche qualitative.

Poisson situe d'abord épistémologiquement la recherche qualitative par rapport au constat de l'influence du positivisme sur la recherche en sciences humaines en général et sur l'éducation en particulier. Il trace ensuite les ramifications de la recherche qualitative en identifiant ce qu'il nomme des familles de recherche qualitative et en introduisant une variété de termes associés (24) que l'on retrouve fréquemment dans les écrits. L'auteur caractérise certaines des ramifications en indiquant leurs particularités. Il conclut cette partie en faisant remarquer la difficulté de cerner de façon précise la nature de la recherche qualitative et en proposant comme fil conducteur à la compréhension de cette approche à la recherche, des éléments d'ordre méthodologique communs, tel le souci de s'approcher du phénomène étudié et la nature émergente de la recherche qui se construit en cours de cheminement. L'intérêt de cette partie réside cependant dans l'analyse des raisons sociales, culturelles, contextuelles qui ont rendu l'approche qualitative à la recherche soudainement plus attrayante pour des chercheurs et des apprentis chercheurs. Ce point de vue est neuf et original dans la variété des discours portant sur la recherche qualitative.

La deuxième partie de l'ouvrage est plus technique et davantage pratique pour des étudiants en recherche. Poisson choisit l'approche ethnographique comme type de recherche et propose une série de conseils pour la mener: des conseils par rapport à la façon d'établir des rapports significatifs avec les participants à la recherche sur le terrain, par rapport au mode de cueillette de données en discutant des avantages et des limites de l'observation participante, non participante, des entrevues semi-structurées. Il présente également une démarche d'analyse des données ainsi que des conseils touchant à la rédaction du rapport de recherche. Ces deux derniers chapitres sont peut-être trop rapides alors que les étapes de l'analyse des données et celle de la rédaction du rapport ethnographique constituent deux phases à la fois problématique et cruciale pour des étudiants en recherche. La systématisation faite est intéressante mais elle gagnerait à être plus étoffée au moyen d'exemples tels qu'on les retrouve dans les chapitres précédents. Le mérite de cette deuxième partie réside sans doute dans le grand souci d'ordre éthique et déontologique que Poisson manifeste et qu'il transmet aux lecteurs. Il se montre soucieux et respectueux des personnes touchées par la recherche et communique l'importance de cette attitude au lecteur.

La troisième partie est consacrée à la formation à la recherche qualitative. Poisson rappelle ce qui se fait dans des universités britanniques et américaines pour former des chercheurs en recherche qualitative et partant, s'interroge sur les compétences qu'il est nécessaire de posséder pour devenir un bon ethnographe scolaire. J'ai regretté de ne pas retrouver dans cette partie

ce qui se faisait au Québec et dans certains pays francophones dont la Belgique et la France où il se fait de la formation. Je me suis également interrogée sur la pertinence d'inclure cette section dans un ouvrage s'adressant aux étudiants en méthodologie de la recherche qualitative. La fin de la troisième partie est à mon sens plus intéressante alors que l'auteur tente d'extraire d'une analyse critique de cinq thèses ethnographiques des caractéristiques d'une bonne recherche qualitative. Ce travail d'analyse permet à l'auteur de préciser les paramètres à l'intérieur desquels s'insère la recherche ethnographique tout en établissant un parallèle avec les particularités du contexte scolaire jetant alors un regard critique sur l'applicabilité de certaines des conditions.

Le livre de Poisson constitue un ouvrage nuancé sur la recherche qualitative et l'ethnographie en milieu scolaire. On sent l'auteur animé du désir de fournir des conseils d'ordre pratique à ceux qui s'initient à ce type de recherche et qui, tout en croyant au mérite de cette approche à la recherche, en voient les limites et les difficultés d'application. Des exemples pertinents aident à saisir l'envergure des concepts développés. De plus, chacun des chapitres se termine par une liste d'ouvrages de référence que l'étudiant, désireux de poursuivre une réflexion, pourrait consulter. L'auteur atteint bien ses objectifs de procurer de l'information sur la recherche qualitative, de stimuler la réflexion par rapport à la démarche méthodologique appropriée à l'ethnographie en milieu scolaire et de fournir de l'information sur la formation qui se fait dans d'autres pays sur la méthodologie de la recherche qualitative.

Teaching Critical Thinking: Dialogue and Dialectic

By John E. McPeck

New York, London: Routledge, 1990. xviii + 135 pages.

REVIEWED BY J. ANTHONY BLAIR, UNIVERSITY OF WINDSOR

Teaching Critical Thinking is a collection of mostly previously-published papers, seven by John McPeck. Part I includes McPeck's 1984 paper on teaching critical thinking, his 1985 attack on general reasoning ability and informal logic, and his 1984 critique of critical thinking tests, as well as two new papers presenting McPeck's view that critical thinking should be taught through the traditional liberal arts disciplines, along with practical guidelines on how to do this. In Part II are reprinted two exchanges arising from McPeck's 1981 monograph, *Critical Thinking and Education*, one between Stephen Norris, Harvey Siegel, and McPeck, and the other between Richard Paul and McPeck.

MCPECK'S POSITION: CRITICAL THINKING "THROUGH THE DISCIPLINES"

McPeck takes critical thinking to be the disposition to engage in an activity or problem with "reflective skepticism"—that is, a skepticism that questions procedures, beliefs, or fundamental assumptions, just when we suspect something is amiss with their normal operation or employment (p. 42). The critical thinker must know when normal rational procedures are adequate for the task at hand, and so has considerable knowledge of the subject area in question.

Critical thinking thus conceived is best learned by absorbing the subject matter of the disciplines that make up a liberal education (p. 30)—including the natural and social sciences, history, mathematics, literature, and art (p. 16)—along with an understanding of the epistemology of each discipline (pp. 16–17, 31). By thus learning the "facts" and methods (plus the means of assessing them) of the liberal arts disciplines, the student will be educated as a critical thinker (pp. 16–18, 32–33, chaps. 3 and 4 *passim*).

McPeck's argument is avowedly Wittgensteinian. The dependence of thought on language, and the contextualization of any language's rules of predication (its rules of reasoning) in its culture's "forms of life" (such as the disciplines), mean one can learn to reason only by learning the language of some form of life (pp. 35–36). Now, the traditional liberal arts disciplines cover the topics an educated person will tend to encounter (pp. 30, 120). Also, their rules of reasoning are the bases for solving the interdisciplinary problems an educated person will confront (pp. 10–12, 119). Hence, the best education for critical thinking is the mastery of those disciplines and their epistemologies.

A corollary is that there can in principle be no general, discipline-neutral rules of reasoning (aside from the meta-language rules of classical logic [p. 37]), and so no generally applicable reasoning skills and no extra-domain transfer of domain-specific reasoning skills (*passim*).

McPeck offers advice about how best to teach critical thinking through the disciplines. In elementary school, teach the systems of information basic to the disciplines. Then in high school, besides adding more content, teach the "philosophy-of" each discipline along with its methodologies, and require students to formulate their own opinions and to support them with arguments (pp. 15–18, 32–33, 50–53).

Someone seeking to probe McPeck's positive doctrine critically might consider exploring the precise nature of any embedding of rules of reasoning/language/thought in each discipline. Are all disciplines on a par in this respect? Are there indeed no non-formal but domain-general norms of reasoning or of argument? In another direction, how are the disciplines themselves to be defined, independently of the forms of reasoning they exhibit? McPeck does not confront these questions.

MCPECK'S STRATEGY: ATTACK THE CRITICAL THINKING MOVEMENT

McPeck's strategy, in almost every paper, is to attack what he represents as the dominant doctrines of critical thinking, giving his own positive theses only in the interstices of such critiques, or in brief concluding sections. He thereby gives the (false) impression that anyone who proposes teaching critical thinking, whether in separate courses or units, or instead (or also) infused throughout the curriculum, must disagree entirely with his views. To be sure, as the papers by Norris, Siegel, and Paul show, there are many points of disagreement, but no proponent of teaching critical thinking says it should *replace* history, science, literature, mathematics, and so on.

McPeck believes he stands alone for common sense and against massive stupidity (pp. 19–21, 33). But this impression is created by a sustained (unintentional) misrepresentation of others' positions. A fair sample of the "claims" McPeck attacks are these: (1) there is single, unitary general reasoning ability (p. 4); (2) learning how to analyze arguments is equivalent to, or a substitute for, a general reasoning ability (p. 6); (3) learning how to identify fallacies, questionable assertions, or assumptions in arguments makes one a critical thinker in any area no matter what the subject matter (p. 20); (4) the notion of "ordinary everyday argument" circumscribes the domain of informal logic (p. 6); (5) courses in thinking or reasoning imply that it is possible to think or reason in general but not about anything in particular (p. 20); (6) having skills in reasoning is sufficient for being a critical thinker; no knowledge and understanding of any subject is necessary (p. 26); and (7) in education the process of reasoning should take precedence over the content of what is being reasoned about (p. 34).

Yet McPeck fails to demonstrate that any of the authors he names, or who identify with the groups he mentions, hold or are committed to *a single one of these positions*. He just *says* that named individuals, or "movements" or "approaches" or "typical courses" hold or are committed to such theses (see, for instance, p. 34), but these are caricatures of views people actually hold. In his exchanges with Norris and Siegel, where the texts are readily inspected, McPeck's misinterpretations, and consequent irrelevant rejoinders, are glaring. For instance, [McPeck:] "That Norris does assume the existence of general reasoning skills can be seen from the fact that it is clearly embedded in most of his discussion. For example: [Norris:] '. . . to say that someone has critical thinking ability is to make a claim about a mental power which that person possesses'" (p. 90). Norris is here talking about *what is implied by the claim* that there are critical thinking abilities; he is not himself making that claim.

Since I am among those sharply criticized by McPeck, my unsupported rejoinders should not be taken on faith. Nor can I here defend my opinion that McPeck totally distorts informal logic, though I record it lest McPeck once more infer agreement from a failure to state disagreement (p. 121). Let

me suggest the reader would do well to examine independently the positions McPeck castigates.

CONCLUSION

Teaching Critical Thinking is a handy collection of a decade's worth of McPeck's crusade against the infidel of critical thinking. The reader can extract from it McPeck's own interesting and plausible views about how critical thinking should be conceived and taught. But most of McPeck's contributions focus on shortcomings he ascribes to what I would argue are misrepresentations of other approaches to teaching critical thinking.

Twentieth Century Philosophy of Education

Edited by William Hare

Halifax: Dalhousie University Learning Resource Services, 1990. 60 minutes.

REVIEWED BY ALLEN T. PEARSON, UNIVERSITY OF ALBERTA

This audiotope presents the views of four eminent twentieth-century philosophers of education in a clear, accessible, and literate manner. Jonas Soltis, William Hare, Harvey Siegel, and Robin Barrow, respectively, ably discuss the central ideas of John Dewey, Bertrand Russell, Israel Scheffler, and R.S. Peters. Each commentator uses three or four themes from each philosopher's work and offers an overview of the philosopher's position in a fifteen-minute discussion. The result is four neat, clear, and insightful introductions to the ideas of these important and influential thinkers.

I will not try to summarize the four discussions. The commentators successfully identify the core ideas of these philosophers and present those ideas straightforwardly. Anyone familiar with the work of these philosophers will find a summary of their ideas superfluous; anyone not familiar with the work of any of these authors need only listen to the appropriate section of this audiotope.

Each commentator has fifteen minutes to present the ideas of an important, complex, and subtle thinker. It would be unfair to criticize them for having left out important aspects of the person's thought, for not having gone into sufficient depth, or for not raising criticisms of the person's thought. Instead, I want to discuss briefly how this audiotope provides an introduction to all of twentieth-century philosophy of education.

What this tape does, perhaps unwittingly, is to demonstrate that the central concern of philosophy of education in this century, at least in the English-speaking world, has been to promote the rational capabilities of individual persons, to promote independence in thought, and to enable persons to be critical, reflective, and imaginative thinkers. Philosophers of education, of whatever stripe, have seen the purpose of schools as to promote students' rational abilities so they are enabled to be independent and intelligent judges of what choices and decisions to make. Hare and Siegel view this promotion of reasoning as the key aim of the philosophers they discuss. The point is more implicit in Soltis and Barrow, although neither Dewey nor Peters would object to the notion that education should be concerned with enabling people to be clear and critical thinkers (although both would want to add some important qualifications). The audiotape shows a basic unity of concern in philosophy of education.

This perspective may be a result of the influence of liberal thought in philosophy, which places greatest emphasis on individualism and autonomy. It is reflected as well in the dominant ethical theories of our time. Here moral responsibility is seen as inevitably and irreducibly individual. Moral education, which is to bring about moral responsibility, is a matter of how to enable individuals to make appropriate moral decisions for themselves, that is, to enable them to be autonomous moral agents. Given these commitments in philosophy with respect to society and morality, it is not surprising to find the development of autonomous rational thinkers at the centre of philosophy of education.

Where the philosophers under consideration part company is in their social concerns. For Dewey, the ideal of democracy is at least as important as the ideal of independent, critical thought. It is not only people who have to engage in meaningful learning, communities must do so as well to provide for growth in the quality of experience. The other philosophers represented here show much less concern for social questions, although, as Barrow notes, Peters came to this understanding in his later writings. As the century draws to a close, we see a resurgence of concern for social and communitarian issues. Feminist and postmodern writers in particular question our commitments to autonomy and individuality. Whether these writings are as durable and influential as the ones here under consideration remains an open question.

The audiotape also tackles the relation of philosophy of education to "pure" philosophy or philosophy proper, leaving the innuendo that philosophy of education is somehow impure or improper. Siegel discusses the point most directly in his contention that Scheffler's success lies in large part in his ability to make his philosophy of education, philosophy of science, and philosophy of language parts of an integrated and coherent body of work. The philosophers discussed here received their graduate training in other than philosophy of education, and none of their careers was

entirely in philosophy of education. There may be lessons here for how we conceptualize careers and graduate preparation in philosophy of education.

A final point is to ask who would find this tape beneficial. Given the brevity of the discussions, it will be of little help to scholars working on any of these four authors. Rather it will serve to provide a neat summary of the philosophers for undergraduates. I am inclined to think that given the density of ideas in each of the discussions, one may need to have some understanding or familiarity with the philosopher prior to hearing the tape. However, with a little prior knowledge, the taped discussion will provide a fine and useful overview of the ideas of these important thinkers.

L'éducation: 25 ans plus tard! et après?

Par Fernand Dumont et Yves Martin (dir.).

Québec: Institut québécois de la recherche sur la culture, 1990. 432 pages.

RECENSION PAR HÉLÈNE BOIVIN, UNIVERSITÉ DE SHERBROOKE

Cet ouvrage réunit les communications présentées lors d'un colloque tenu à Québec à l'occasion du 25^e anniversaire de la création du ministère de l'Éducation et du Conseil supérieur de l'Éducation, en collaboration avec le ministère de l'Éducation et le ministère de l'Enseignement supérieur et de la Science.

Le livre comprend 22 textes dans lesquels les auteurs cherchent à faire un bilan ou à brosser un tableau de l'état de la situation de l'éducation québécoise en regard de quatre paramètres particuliers: la démocratie scolaire, la conception de l'éducation, les pratiques de l'enseignement et l'éducateur. La conclusion dégage des vues d'ensemble et des perspectives concernant l'an 2 000.

D'entrée de jeu, relevons le caractère hautement actuel de l'ensemble des problématiques, des données et des analyses en cause. Les cinq tests de la première partie mettent l'accent sur la pierre angulaire de la réforme de l'éducation des années 1960 qu'est la démocratisation scolaire. Un texte de Pierre Dandurand fait état de la scolarisation accrue faite d'avancées fort inégales selon les groupes sociaux étudiés. Cette analyse est complétée par celle de Marcel Saint-Jacques qui pose le problème de l'égalité des chances d'accès à l'éducation dans les milieux défavorisés et qui trace un bilan des résultats générés par les mesures compensatoires. Marcel Saint-Jacques situe le défi de l'accès à l'école à l'intérieur de l'enjeu éminemment actuel que représente la lutte à la pauvreté. Jean-Pierre Proulx aborde, pour sa part, la problématique complexe de l'organisation scolaire dans un contexte de

diversité culturelle accrue: la confessionnalité, la langue, le statut de l'école (privée/publique) ainsi que l'intégration des jeunes immigrants. Il s'agit d'un tour d'horizon d'une acuité certaine quant aux défis et problèmes auxquels se confronte l'école québécoise du début des années 1990. On traite aussi, dans cette section, de la décentralisation des pouvoirs en matière d'éducation ainsi que du rôle de l'éducation dans le développement régional du Québec.

La deuxième partie, très intéressante, traite de la conception de l'éducation qui régit tous les ordres d'enseignement, l'éducation permanente incluse. Trois des cinq textes me sont apparus fort pertinents. Claude Trottier s'intéresse à la vocation du secondaire et met en évidence la confusion qui prévaut en regard des objectifs de la réforme des années 1960. La formation de base, l'aide aux élèves en difficulté, la diversification des contenus, l'obtention du diplôme d'études secondaires, la formation professionnelle sont autant de pistes autour desquelles s'articule sa réflexion. Dans la même veine, Louise Corriveau trace un portrait dynamique et éloquent du collégial en montrant la difficulté qu'éprouve cet ordre d'enseignement, depuis sa création, à déterminer les objectifs qu'il poursuit: problème de coordination avec le secondaire et entre les programmes, problème d'articulation des formations générale et spécialisée à l'intérieur du champ éducatif et réhabilitation de l'histoire et de la culture à titre d'outil essentiel d'appropriation et de compréhension du social pour l'élève comme pour tout citoyen. Un texte savoureux de Guy Rocher met en lumière deux facteurs déjà déterminants quant au rôle des universités et qui risquent bien de l'affecter encore plus dans les décennies à venir. D'abord, la fonction économique de plus en plus importante qu'assume la techno-science dans les nations modernes et l'intérêt qu'elle revêt de ce fait. L'auteur s'attarde à montrer comment le double rôle de formation et de recherche que remplit l'université est affecté par une telle révolution. Ensuite, le problème de la démocratisation du système d'enseignement universitaire qui, pour la première fois depuis son existence, doit faire face à l'enseignement de masse et résoudre les multiples tensions et frustrations générées par une telle situation.

La troisième partie de l'ouvrage propose une illustration de pratiques éducatives à partir de cinq textes dont deux se situent à l'intérieur d'un questionnement à saveur fortement contemporaine: l'enseignement des sciences humaines dans les collèges et les universités (Louis Maheu) et celui des sciences par Pierre-Léon Trempe. Ces judicieuses analyses portent à s'interroger sérieusement sur ce que visent ces enseignements. Amener l'élève "à faire" de la physique comme dira Trempe ou "lui en montrer"?

Trois superbes écrits constituent la dernière partie de l'ouvrage qui a trait à l'éducateur comme tel. Claude Lessard, Jean Hamelin et Madeleine Perron posent, chacun à leur façon, un regard sur la tâche, le statut, la valorisation, les enjeux et les multiples défis sous-jacents à la profession d'enseignant.

Comme le souligne Robert Bisaillon en conclusion, six observations majeures se dégagent de la vie et de l'évolution des institutions, établisse-

ments et personnels scolaires: l'accessibilité à l'éducation reste à rendre effective auprès de certaines clientèles; la diversité des populations scolaires s'est accrue et une grande hétérogénéité caractérise les populations scolaires actuelles; les connaissances se modifient et se multiplient à un rythme impitoyable; la spécialisation hâtive, l'hyperspécialisation et la disciplinarité excessive entraînent de sérieux cloisonnements sur le plan de l'acquisition d'une formation; l'acte professionnel d'enseignement est à réhabiliter dans un contexte de tâches de plus en plus complexes; le partage des pouvoirs est à revoir.

Paul Tremblay, dans une synthèse-éclair de ce colloque, dégage quatre points d'ancrage autour desquels l'école de l'an 2 000 poursuivra son développement: l'égalisation des chances, l'intégration des immigrants, la formation de base, l'articulation des ordres d'enseignement et les enseignants.

French Immersion: Myths and Reality

By Hector Hammerly

Calgary: Detselig Enterprises, 1989. 164 pages.

REVIEWED BY MONIQUE BOURNOT-TRITES, UNIVERSITY OF BRITISH COLUMBIA

This book's title holds promise for parents and for researchers. Parents wishing their children to learn French might expect to find information about French immersion programs and the success of these programs in teaching French and other subjects. Researchers might hope to find recorded in one place the results of empirical evaluations of French immersion programs. The book does not, however, fulfil its promise. It is constituted instead of two main sections dealing with the failure of French immersion programs (four chapters), and "a better classroom road to bilingualism" (four chapters).

Although ideas in Hammerly's critique of French immersion merit investigation, research he presents has low validity, and his non-academic language diminishes, if not destroys the credibility of every statement in his book.

Hammerly's exposition of the ideal French language program, which he names the Principled Eclectic Method, calls for step-by-step instruction under a teacher's careful guidance and control. The teacher must ensure that students acquire prerequisite subskills before attempting more advanced behaviours. His approach is based wholly on behaviourist theories and does not take into account any of the findings of the more recent cognitivist school. Hammerly's critique of French immersion might be acceptable were it not so anecdotal and made without clear references to research.

The author himself, commenting on his own assertions, states that “such observations are merely anecdotal” (p. 11). For example, he writes that “French Immersion teachers, parents and graduates tell stories of children coming home crying every afternoon for months” (p. 9). This statement has no foundation since (a) no research has been done on the subject, (b) this claim has never appeared in any French immersion evaluation report, and (c) the claim is not based on systematic and objective observation. However, Hammerly’s remark leads the reader to believe this is a general problem of a magnitude never encountered in English schools. This comment might well dissuade potential immersion parents from choosing French immersion for their child. This would be most unfortunate since in kindergarten classrooms some pupils find it harder to be separated from home than do others. If this were a generalized problem assignable to immersion programs, French immersion parents, concerned with their children’s well-being and extremely involved in school activities, would surely take account of so negative a situation.

To back up his declarations, Hammerly often refers to studies without giving references. Statements such as “Several studies have shown” (p. 25), “has proven to be unreliable” (p. 26), “two certain advocates of FI” (p. 29), “some educators have been saying for some time” (p. 58) are numerous and do not evince high academic standards. In other cases, Hammerly expresses negative opinions about French immersion as if these opinions were facts. For example, he says that “French Immersion children who transfer to a regular program in the first few grades find themselves at a disadvantage in virtually all school subjects, including English” (p. 11) without citing any study to support his declaration.

The heart of Hammerly’s argument is that French immersion is based on incorrect assumptions about second language learning in the classroom. Here again, the author gives no source for these assumptions and oddly enough justifies himself by saying that “the origin of an assumption is much less important than whether the facts support it.” He then claims the assumption French immersion would produce excellent linguistic results is false because it is not supported by the facts. Yet if this assumption were to be supported by facts, the word “excellent” would have necessarily to be defined operationally. In any case this particular assumption has never been a feature of French immersion programs. Many of Hammerly’s assumptions are equally unfounded. His second assumption, for example, that “unconscious second language acquisition is better than conscious second language learning” has been offered only by Krashen as a possible explanation for positive linguistic results in French immersion, on research Krashen did well after French immersion programs had started. French immersion programs have never been constructed on the basis of this second assumption.

Hammerly uses his own research and that of his associates to critique French immersion. Unfortunately, serious methodological flaws undermine

his results. In one of his studies, the number of subjects is only 7. One can hardly hope to generalize from such a small number! In another of his studies, Hammerly interviewed two former immersion students about their experience (one of the interviews is reproduced in Appendix B of the book). Apart from the fact that the number is rather small as a basis for generalizing to the entire population, these two students were far from being chosen at random. Hammerly explains, "I came to know Janice fairly well when she was a student in one of my courses on theories of language teaching/learning. She was one of only two students in a large class to receive a grade of A+ in the course. To prevent a 'pleasing-the-teacher' effect, this interview was conducted long after the course was over" (p. 147). As if so biased choice of subject were not enough, the interview was full of leading questions and comments. For example, after the student says her oral ability is fine, he asks, "You didn't make errors when you spoke?", and later when she says, "Of course, we speak like native speakers. We speak French better than most people," Hammerly comments, "Well, yes, but speaking French better than most people is not the same as being native-like, and I think that the standards should be higher" (p. 156). The quality of this research is simply appalling.

Hammerly has nothing positive to say about French immersion. Although he might conceivably be right (or wrong), his research and analysis are utterly unconvincing.

After making a critique of French immersion programs, Hammerly presents his views of learning a second language. They are, to say the least, original.

For the author, learning is not a progress along a continuum of trial and error, but rather is concerned with the achievement of perfection. He argues that French immersion students do not speak French but Frenglish, then adds "Frenglish is not a language, nor a dialect, but an embarrassment" (p. 18). I would argue in opposition that Frenglish is only a point in the continuum of learning French in an English environment. It shows that students use what they know of their mother language and transfer it to their second language. In many cases, they are right and this is called positive transfer (Hammerly does not mention this feature of language learning). In other cases, English structures and French structures are different and students produce errors that only feedback can correct. The transfer phenomenon shows that students are not passive learners dependent on their environment, but rather that they are active, thinking, and reflecting beings. Of course, Hammerly believes that students who use English structures will never correct themselves, and will be victims of "fossilization." Fossilization is a notion so far unsupported by any careful research.

In the "ideal French language program," students should (according to Hammerly) be under the total control (and this word is used extremely often) of the teacher and should not be allowed to express utterances they

have not formally learned already: "Use should be limited to what has been learned—no more, no less" (p. 48). The role of the teacher is to control students' output, and "not to be afraid to exert his or her authority" (p. 63). This would be fine if students were robots with no creative intelligence. This method is based on behaviourist principles (dating from the seventeenth century, according to the author) and ignores completely cognitive conceptions of learning that recognize the learner as an active participant in learning, and that see learning as embodying an interaction between new knowledge and prior knowledge. The learner's cognitive processes are as important as environmental variables and cannot be ignored or be put under the complete control of the teacher. How is it possible for a teacher to control what a learner thinks, perceives, and expresses? How could a method that denies learners the use of their cognitive abilities be called an "ideal program"?

The objective of Hammerly's method is "that graduates understand French and speak and write it accurately, in a socially appropriate manner, and with reasonable fluency" (p. 44). Furthermore, Hammerly defines accuracy and appropriateness as absolute perfection in the language. These goals are highly commendable but not very pragmatic. Most educated Francophones do not attain them in a lifetime! And in the end, there is no agreement on perfection in language. Considerable differences in degree of tolerance between spoken and written language can be observed and even within the code of the written language there is a great deal of variability in norms. Which norms is Hammerly recommending and/or using?

French immersion programs are more pragmatic in both means and ends. Their goal is to make their graduates functionally bilingual, able to communicate with native speakers, replete with positive feelings about their second language, and able after graduation to proceed along the continuum of learning toward "perfection." After all, the first goal of French immersion programs is to educate their pupils as well as they would be in an English program. Careful studies have shown that this goal has been reached. Functional French is simply a bonus of these programs.

French immersion programs are still developing and do not claim perfection. Most studies so far have compared French immersion programs to English programs on academic achievement. It is time to examine more closely the processes involved in learning a second language in immersion. Cognitive variables linked to positive and negative transfer are important aspects of learning; when we understand their mechanisms, we shall teach more efficiently. Hammerly's research and books certainly do not contribute to our understanding of language learning or to better teaching. To all appearances, they are motivated by an a priori negative bias against French immersion. I would not recommend the book to anyone interested in French immersion. I might, on the other hand, recommend it to graduate students as an example of what not to do in research.

*Official Language Minority Education Rights in Canada:
From Instruction to Management / Les droits scolaires des minorités de
langue officielle au Canada: de l'instruction à la gestion*

By/par Angéline Martel

Ottawa: Office of the Commissioner of Official Languages / Commissariat
aux langues officielles, 1991. 392/409 pages.

REVIEWED BY CLAUDETTE TARDIF, FACULTÉ SAINT-JEAN, UNIVERSITY OF
ALBERTA

The Office of the Commissioner of Official Languages is to be commended for commissioning a study of official language minority rights in Canada. In the words of the Commissioner (p. 2), the purposes of the study were to clarify the meaning and the scope of Section 23 of the Charter of Rights and Freedoms, to provide an overall picture in respect to minority education rights in each jurisdiction, and to define the elements essential to minority school administration. Angéline Martel of the Télé-Université du Québec in Montreal was given the task of conducting the research and writing the study.

The book provides data on the current and potential situation of minority instruction and school management, beginning with a summary of court interpretations of section 23 of the Charter, then describing the educational system in each jurisdiction with an overview of instruction and school management for official language minorities. Chapters 3 and 4, concerned with school management, present analyses of majority school management models and offer an evaluation grid useful in analyzing minority management models. The book ends with a summary of gains in each province between 1982 and 1990 in recognition of rights.

In many respects, this work is a follow-up to Pierre Foucher's (1985) *Constitutional Language Rights of Official-Language Minorities in Canada*. Foucher's study described the record of each province in implementing the education rights of official language minorities and analyzed the effects of the rights conferred by section 23 of the Charter on official language minority groups in Canada. Interestingly, Foucher suggested a follow-up study, after five years' elapsed time, to review the situation. Martel's study extends this previous work, reporting on changes between 1982 and 1990. The two studies follow much the same plan in reporting on facts and on the school system of each jurisdiction.

Although this book is an excellent reference for anyone interested in the education rights of official language minorities and on the state of official minorities education in Canada, it does not make for easy reading. Though the author tries to be pedagogically helpful, the book comes across as

technical and almost encyclopedic. The reader is overwhelmed by a mass of numbers and tables. Because of extensive use of summaries and summary tables, there is much repetition. Perhaps the document is not meant to be read from cover to cover but only to be consulted in regard to a specific province or a specific issue.

The section on instruction and school management in a minority setting was most stimulating. In presenting reasons underlying minority demands for instruction and school management, the author places the issue of minority education rights in socio-cultural context. An understanding of the impact of the socio-cultural context on relationships between the "majority" and the "minority" is exceedingly important in establishing educational policy and practice.

It is to be regretted the author limited herself to reviewing existing and proposed organizational models. The choice of one such model, that of the Edmonton Catholic School District, is questionable. This model was a discussion paper not taken seriously even by Edmonton's Francophone population.

The author's recommendations do not show how Canadian linguistic and cultural diversity may provide valuable social and educational goals for the majority as well as for the minority, nor do they show the closeness in interests of the majority and the minority. One has a sense of the Francophone minority as a group apart, operating solely on the traditional rights principle, and from the legalistic framework of section 23. This is in large part factually true. However, the study would have benefited from a deeper analysis of the linguistic and cultural requirements of Francophone minorities in Canada, their vision, and their aspirations, as well as a consideration of the majority perspective. The understandings, assumptions, and values of the language rationale advocated by both the majority society and the official minority deserve scrutiny. Questions about language maintenance, preservation of culture, and educational opportunities have much to do with the "rapport des forces" between a majority group and the minority. Different visions of the role of established minorities and the importance of language and education rights for the official minority often separate the minority view from the majority view.

Although the book does not cover all issues in official minority education rights in Canada, Martel does provide a comprehensive and thorough analysis of many of the chief issues. Parents, educators, and administrators would profit from this work.

La gestion de l'excellence en éducation

Par Gérard Éthier

Sillery: Presses de l'Université du Québec, 1989. 360 pages.

RECENSION PAR JEAN MOISSET, UNIVERSITÉ LAVAL

Trois cent soixante pages regroupées en quatorze chapitres sur la gestion de l'excellence en éducation, c'est sûrement l'indice d'une problématique abondamment traitée. En rendre compte n'est pas tâche aisée. En tout cas, la variété des sujets abordés défie quiconque dans un résumé de prétendre à l'exhaustivité. Heureusement, d'entrée de jeu, l'auteur offre un fil directeur en trois segments qu'il est utile de reprendre ici: a) "Les organisations publiques ne peuvent se satisfaire d'un rendement minimal; elles doivent relever le défi de l'excellence; b) L'excellence en éducation, puisque c'est de cela qu'il s'agit, apparaît comme un problème auquel font face plusieurs sociétés, y compris la société québécoise, et celles qui le régleront le plus rapidement offriront les meilleures chances de succès à leurs citoyens; c) L'excellence ne peut être atteinte que par la volonté des personnes concernées, les gestionnaires étant les principaux acteurs d'une telle opération" (p. 1). Et il aurait pu ajouter—mais il le dira plus loin—que c'est au niveau de l'école, noyau de base du système éducatif, que cette problématique est analysée et que pistes de réflexions et moyens d'action sont offerts aux chercheurs et aux praticiens.

L'idée centrale de l'ouvrage, c'est que "l'excellence en éducation ne peut être atteinte que par l'excellence de sa gestion." On sera déçu si de là, on s'attend à ce que l'ouvrage développe, illustre et démontre cette idée qui, à seconde vue, n'est pas acceptable d'évidence. Certes, cette idée, davantage postulat que thèse démontrée, revient en forme de leitmotiv enveloppant le volume qui, de manière concrète, reste une revue assez systématique des "concepts, principes et théories qui ont depuis longtemps façonné les sciences de la gestion et qui forment encore les assises les plus solides pouvant servir à la gestion des écoles" (p. 9). Que le lecteur n'aille donc pas y chercher les éléments d'une théorie novatrice en matière de gestion ou même une démonstration nouvelle d'une thèse, ce que l'énoncé en forme de triptyque plus haut aurait pu laisser croire. Peut-être pour cela l'auteur insiste: "le présent volume est surtout un inventaire, un inventaire fait avec une méthodologie variée" (p. 11), consistant à "examiner pour l'école la valeur des quatre grandes étapes du processus de gestion que sont la planification, l'organisation, la direction et le contrôle" (p. 9) et devant permettre l'atteinte des objectifs de l'ouvrage, à savoir: "contribuer à la compréhension de l'excellence en éducation comme doit l'assurer l'école; faire servir les connaissances générales en gestion à un meilleur fonctionnement de l'école;

ramener toute la dynamique de l'école autour de son objet principal: l'élève-client; servir d'outil critique vis-à-vis l'école" (p. 12).

Dans cette perspective, *La gestion de l'excellence en éducation* constitue un manuel fort utile pour toute personne au Québec préoccupée par les problèmes de la gestion des organisations scolaires en général et de la direction des écoles en particulier. Cette appréciation repose sur une triple observation que nous allons maintenant expliciter.

Comme il a été mentionné plus haut, l'auteur présente une revue relativement exhaustive des écrits les plus récents qui ont été développés dans le champ de la gestion scolaire et cela, en relation avec la recherche de l'excellence en éducation dont le chapitre 2 présente des éléments de définition.

Tout en reconnaissant qu'il n'est pas facile de définir l'excellence en éducation et qu'on ne trouve aucune définition précise de l'excellence (p. 16), l'auteur n'en arrive pas moins à identifier trois paramètres majeurs auxquels, selon lui, s'accroche l'excellence en éducation, à savoir:

1. la *qualité* des ressources humaines, matérielles et financières dont doit disposer un service d'éducation;
2. la *qualité* du processus éducatif où les programmes et les méthodes prennent toute leur mesure;
3. la *qualité* des résultats sur le plan scolaire, mais aussi par rapport au développement personnel et social des étudiants dans le respect des différences individuelles. (p. 16)

Mais cela dit, on ne résout pas pour autant le problème lié au caractère hautement relatif de la notion d'excellence, la *qualité* des trois paramètres dont il est question plus haut étant en étroite dépendance des valeurs et finalités privilégiées par les uns et par les autres. À notre avis, l'auteur ne le signale pas assez et, encore moins, ne souligne pas la multiplicité et la diversité des facteurs susceptibles d'influencer l'atteinte de l'excellence, quel que soit le contenu qu'on veuille bien lui donner. Les facteurs scolaires en général et la gestion des écoles en particulier sont sans doute très importants pour l'excellence en éducation, mais ils sont loin d'être les plus importants et surtout d'être les seuls. Toutefois, étant donné précisément les objectifs définis en fonction de ces valeurs et priorités, il y a des principes d'organisation et de gestion, des procédures et processus d'administration dont la connaissance et l'application sont susceptibles de favoriser l'atteinte.

C'est ce que les 10 chapitres centraux, les chapitres 3 à 12, mettent en relief, décrivant les principales fonctions et les processus majeurs de l'administration dont ils font ressortir les principes de base: le concept et les mesures de l'efficacité (ch. 3), les modèles de gestion et leur application à l'éducation (ch. 4 et 5), les processus de décision et de planification (ch. 6 et 7), de supervision pédagogique et d'évaluation en éducation (ch. 11 et 12), les principes et les modèles d'organisation (ch. 8 et 9) et la fonction de direction (ch. 10). Les deux derniers chapitres se distinguent des précédents, le chapitre 13 s'attachant à présenter l'enseignant québécois, acteur clef du

système, puisque “l’excellence à l’école ne sera atteinte que par l’excellence de ses maîtres” (p. 299) et le dernier (ch. 14) qui est une tentative d’intégration de “cet ensemble d’informations qui peut donner l’impression de connaissances disparates dont les liens ne sont pas évidents” (p. 317).

Nous rejoignons facilement l’auteur à ce dernier égard. Et nous ne sommes pas sûr que le “modèle intégrateur” du dernier chapitre compense pour cette allure de bric à brac qui ne manquera pas de frapper le lecteur devant cette succession de chapitres, certes denses et riches, mais entre lesquels on ne voit pas les liens logiques, sinon la référence à *l’excellence* qui revient continuellement comme une formule incantatoire. C’est là, à notre avis, une faiblesse qui se traduit par des recoupements entre chapitres ou parties de chapitres, par exemple entre les chapitres 3 et 12 en ce qui concerne *l’évaluation*, entre les chapitres 5, 7 et 10 en ce qui concerne *les rôles ou fonctions des directeurs d’école*. Cependant, cette faiblesse disparaît complètement, si on considère chacun des chapitres comme autant d’unités autonomes, ce qui nous amène à la deuxième raison de notre appréciation globalement positive de l’ouvrage.

Autonomie relative des chapitres ou recoupements, selon l’angle de vue du lecteur, sont deux éléments qui donnent une grande force didactique à l’ouvrage de M. Éthier, dans lequel les étudiants en administration scolaire au Québec et dans le monde francophone en général trouveront un outil souple d’apprentissage. Il faut souligner à cet égard l’effort payant de rapprochement ou d’application des principes et modèles généraux de gestion aux réalités du monde scolaire. À cet égard, les chapitres 13 et 14 apportent des éclairages intéressants sur l’enseignant et le modèle d’enseignement au Québec.

Le troisième mérite de *La gestion de l’excellence en éducation* est tout simplement d’exister. Il vient certes s’ajouter à des écrits qui, en français, sont plutôt faibles quantitativement en ce qui concerne l’administration scolaire au Québec. Avec, en plus, une précision et une clarté de style qui ajoutent à la force didactique de l’ouvrage.

Autant de raisons pour lesquelles ce livre ne devrait pas être ignoré de tous ceux, étudiants, professeurs et praticiens qui travaillent dans le champ de la gestion de l’éducation au Québec.

The Man in the Ivory Tower: F. Cyril James of McGill

By Stanley Brice Frost

Montreal: McGill-Queen's University Press, 1991. xiv + 314 pages.

REVIEWED BY JAMES M. PITSULA, UNIVERSITY OF REGINA

The Man in the Ivory Tower is a study of the public and private life of F. Cyril James, principal of McGill University from 1940 to 1962. The title has a double meaning in that James believed the university should serve, rather than be isolated from, society. On the other hand, author Stanley Frost convincingly makes the case that in his personal life James built walls around himself, preventing others from coming emotionally close to him. We are left with the impression that although James' career was outwardly a success, he did not find personal fulfillment.

Born into a working-class family in London, England in 1903, James struggled against financial adversity to obtain a Bachelor of Commerce degree from the London School of Economics. He emigrated in 1923 to the United States, where his academic career prospered. His British accent and dapper appearance led colleagues and students at the University of Pennsylvania to assume he had an upper-class background, and he was not inclined to dispel the illusion. At the age of 36, he was catapulted to the principalship of McGill, partly because Chancellor Edward Beatty saw him as a man who could correct some of the socialistic influences at work on the campus. James was neither a socialist nor a conservative; he favoured a middle-of-the-road approach to government intervention in the economy.

According to Frost, James was a "meticulous administrator" who kept the affairs of McGill in good order. He helped persuade the federal government to give money to the universities, even though the victory was tarnished by Duplessis's refusal to allow Quebec universities to accept the federal largesse. James took an active part in international university associations, serving a term as president of the International Association of Universities. These commitments took him away for extended periods of time from the McGill campus where, by the early 1960s, discontent was brewing. Chancellor R.E. Powell forced the principal's summary dismissal, causing James to suffer "the deepest-hurting of his life." There was little support in the academic community for the deposed principal. Frost quotes only one letter of support, and even that letter dwells on the manner of James' termination, not the termination itself.

In his private life James found it difficult to forge close relationships. His marriage was strained, and his wife escaped to England as often as she could. As for the other members of his family, he was dutiful to them but aloof. Frost notes James' annoyance when his father took a job as a night

watchman on a Montreal wharf. This suggests the McGill principal was embarrassed by his social origins. He was also given to bouts of severe self-doubt when he felt overwhelmed by a sense of inferiority and incompetence.

Clues about James' character and personality are scattered throughout the book, but there is no attempt to pull them together to form a coherent picture of the man. Frost does not answer the essential question to be asked in a biography—what was this person like and why was he that way? Instead, pages are fill with travelogue-style accounts of James' trips to India, the Soviet Union, Greece, Indonesia and numerous other lands. An example of the author's misplaced priorities is his comment about James' diary, "The lack of material regarding the coronation of Queen Elizabeth is particularly disappointing." Readers of James' biography are not interested in Queen Elizabeth's coronation; we're interested in what made James tick.

Nor has the author been especially diligent in seeking out sources of information, for example, interviews with people who knew James. MacKenzie King's caustic characterization of James as "an ass of a fellow" suggests the King diary should have been consulted. Overall, *The Man in the Ivory Tower* is an interesting, smoothly written, but ultimately unsatisfying book.

*A Bridge Built Halfway: A History of Memorial University College
1925–1950*

By Malcolm MacLeod

Montreal: MacGill-Queen's University Press, 1990. xvi + 376 pages.

REVIEWED BY JOHN W. NETTEN, MEMORIAL UNIVERSITY OF
NEWFOUNDLAND

Memorial University of Newfoundland is now the largest university in Atlantic Canada, although by the standards of the area it is one of the youngest, dating only from 1925, when it was established as a memorial to those many Newfoundlanders who fell in the First World War. Its history readily divides into two periods, with the watershed occurring in 1949, the year best known in Newfoundland as marking the entry of that province into Confederation. Prior to 1949 the institution, then known as Memorial University College, offered essentially only the first two years of university work. After 1949, the College became a full-fledged university, granting its own degrees, and soon began to participate in the rapid expansion that characterized the Canadian university scene of the period.

Malcolm MacLeod has undertaken the task of writing the history of the first of the University's two eras, beginning with the difficulties inherent in creating a non-denominational institution of higher learning in a place where virtually all formal education was under control of the Church, and in a place and time where local resources were so scanty that any beginning was possible only with the infusion of considerable outside funding. The interplay between various figures within and without the College who exercised significant influence, receives much attention, as does the College's public, social, and economic context. The story is traced through the difficult early years, the trauma of economic depression and loss of self government, the years of the governing of the colony by Commission of Government, the Second World War, which proved to be very close to home for Newfoundlanders, and the post-war years leading to proposals for full university status.

The work is based on extensive documentary research and on oral interviews conducted with a random sample of fifteen percent of the graduates of the College from 1926 to 1950. Since the period covered by the history is relatively brief, the author has elected to present the material thematically. Some lack of continuity results, along with a loss of a sense of the overall development of the institution.

The author's thesis that Memorial University College was essentially a Canadian institution exerting Canadian influences in a colony with very close historic ties with British institutions. The author presents evidence to show that most graduates who pursued further study did so in Canada, that many of the faculty were Canadian or returning Newfoundlanders, and that the curriculum was designed to fit with Canadian institutions. Although the thesis holds for the College, students in the Normal School and in teacher training normally completed their studies without going elsewhere. The Normal School principal had studied in the United States, and the staff for teacher-training purposes was locally hired.

The history of Memorial University College was tied during its first years to that of the Normal School established five years before the College and situated in the same building until the School closed in 1932 for want of outside funding. The author correctly highlights early friction between the two institutions, one populated by a student body predominantly from St. John's—the "townies"—and the other predominantly by students from the outports—the "baymen"—and generally characterizes the Normal School as successful. The contribution of this small School, highly atypical in its late appearance, its extremely limited activity, the length of its program, the number of its students, and the brevity of its period of operation, might be assessed somewhat less positively by writers who have examined the overall pattern of teacher training in North America. This era in the peculiar history of the education of the teacher in Newfoundland would bear further examination, particularly the negative effect of the establishment of the college on teacher education, and the legacy of poor relations between those

persons teaching “academic” subjects, and those engaged in the preparation of teachers. This was an institution neither fully normal school nor fully college.

The author also sees inter-denominational cooperation in the setting up of the College as a significant step in the educational history of Newfoundland. In fact, the arrangement might better be termed co-existence required by limited numbers of students and by lack of resources. The college was actually non-denominational. Inter-denominational cooperation had begun with much earlier efforts at teacher training, notably at the Normal School established in 1920, but remained difficult. The denominational colleges in St. John’s continued to offer, albeit sporadically, a program equivalent to first-year College, and to train teachers. The College may not have “capped” the system, but rather worked “alongside” denominational colleges. Although hard to determine, it would be interesting to know how many students of that era went directly to university and other places.

An author is necessarily dependent at some point on secondary sources. In one or two cases, the author has not been well served. As an example, the study of Newfoundland schools commissioned in 1933 did not advocate that Newfoundland education be made over in the image of England. Although English examples were used, the document mainly proposed overall modernization of curriculum and instructional practices in Newfoundland.

MacLeod has made a significant contribution to the history of Canadian higher education in this volume. The reference to the College as a “Bridge Built Halfway” may also apply to the book itself. One looks to the completion of the bridge, and to the further study of some of his themes in the second era of the institution’s development.

1789 enseigné et imaginé, regards croisés France-Québec

Par Michel Allard et Suzanne Boucher (dir.).

Montréal: Éditions Noir sur Blanc, 1990. 189 pages.

RECENSION PAR BERNARD LEFEBVRE, UNIVERSITÉ DU QUÉBEC À MONTRÉAL

Le Groupe de recherche franco-québécois sur la didactique des sciences humaines a réuni sous une même couverture le résultat de ses recherches. Elles furent proposées et discutées lors d’un colloque tenu à Paris du 2 au 5 mai 1989. Six universitaires québécois et neuf français ont souligné le bicentenaire de la Révolution française, en posant sur cet événement des regards croisés, originant de lieux géo-historiques parfois très éloignés les uns des autres.

La première partie regroupe sous le vocable de Préalables, un seul article orienté sur le Québec français. Il souligne le fait que la “Révolution canadienne”, marquée par la cession du Québec à l’Angleterre en 1763, constitue le tournant brusque d’une collectivité qui perd ses possibilités d’initiative autonome, sur le plan politique, économique et culturel. Trente ans plus tard, la France mettra plus de zèle à épauler la Nouvelle-Angleterre dans son affranchissement qu’elle en avait mis à contrer cette dernière contre l’envahissement de sa propre colonie américaine.

Un article souligne les interprétations divergentes qu’a suscitées l’oeuvre de Lakanal qui a consisté à jeter les bases de l’instruction publique et neutre en France. Se succèdent deux études montrant que les années qui ont suivi 1789 se sont déroulées en continuité avec celles qui ont précédé sous l’ancien régime. Le théâtre retint la forme traditionnelle, même si des thèmes s’inspiraient des transformations politiques et sociales. S’il put servir d’exutoire à la critique de la situation passée ou présente, il le fit dans les règles conventionnelles et acceptées. L’histoire du Musée du Louvre montre que sa vocation remonte à Colbert. Les expositions s’y multipliaient et les artistes y avaient trouvé un toit et un atelier de création. En 1793, le Louvre ouvrait à titre officiel de musée, réalisant ainsi les intentions exprimées antérieurement et actualisant un projet laissé en plan.

Un rapport sur les cahiers de doléances rédigés en vue des états généraux de 1789 par les trois ordres de Corbeil, ville située à 30 km de Paris, montrent les intérêts différents dont chacun se préoccupait et leur disparité selon qu’il s’agissait d’une paroisse rurale ou d’une paroisse urbaine. À remarquer les expressions de révérence respectueuse à l’égard du roi, celui même qui sera pourtant conspué et guillotiné.

La deuxième partie s’intitule: 1789 imaginé. Autrement dit, comment la Révolution française fut-elle appréciée? La vision québécoise de cet événement montre l’espoir qu’a fait naître le changement de régime politique en France. Certains souhaitèrent la libération du Québec à l’égard de l’Angleterre et s’enthousiasmèrent à la pensée du retour à la France. Mais rien ne se passa. L’instauration du parlementarisme rassura les chefs qui reçurent l’appui empressé du clergé catholique. Ce dernier répandait d’ailleurs toute idée de révolution et prônait au contraire la fidélité au pouvoir officiel.

Conscients que les parlementaires n’avaient aucun pouvoir, les Patriotes de 1837–1838 se sont inspirés de 1789 pour amorcer un mouvement révolutionnaire. Leur anticléricalisme ne convenait pas à la situation québécoise. Encore plus, de nombreux ecclésiastiques français émigrèrent au Québec et fortifièrent ainsi le contrôle du clergé sur l’éducation, dans un esprit d’ancien régime.

La question religieuse et la question nationale, longtemps emmêlées, se coloraient fréquemment d’une interprétation défavorable à l’égard de la Révolution française. Tardivel tout comme Henri Bourassa, à l’instar de De Maistre et de Veuillot, la désapprouvèrent. Ils la qualifièrent même de satanique et de tempête qui emporta l’Église et la monarchie. Le premier

considérerait l'indépendance du Canada français comme une nécessité religieuse en vue de christianiser l'Amérique tandis que le second militait en faveur d'un nationalisme canadien- français sur tout le territoire canadien et dans le giron de l'Empire britannique.

Selon François-Xavier Garneau, la conquête anglaise évita au Québec la Révolution française. Au contraire, Lionel Groulx considérait 1760 comme une catastrophe nationale qui légua une âme de vaincus aux conquies.

Deux études élucident l'idée que la Révolution française n'a pas atteint son objectif instantanément. Proudhon croit que la révolution politique doit être suivie de la révolution sociale et économique. Quant à Ferdinand Lasalle, en Allemagne, le processus révolutionnaire en est un à long terme. Le principe de l'égalité en droit de tous entraîne la suppression de tout privilège. Mais, sans la révolution socialiste, le capital peut seul permettre l'acquisition de l'éducation et la conservation de l'indépendance dans le combat de la libre concurrence.

La troisième partie traite de 1789 dans les manuels d'histoire. De 1800 à 1905, les programmes et les manuels québécois interprétèrent la Révolution française de façon manichéenne, la qualifiant d'entreprise négative, anti-religieuse et anti-monarchiste. De 1905 à 1956, le point de vue religieux absorba toute l'analyse de ce phénomène socio-politique et en fit une phase d'anarchie. Rompant avec ce système référentiel de valeurs, depuis 1956, le programme exploite plutôt une grille socialisante d'analyse où prédominent les dimensions économiques et sociales.

La laïcisation de l'éducation au XIXe siècle en France mit l'Église en situation de défense. Son pouvoir sur l'école publique étant compromise, plusieurs religieux vinrent poursuivre au Québec leur oeuvre d'éducation. On en trouve l'un des effets dans la formation des maîtres. Les religieux et les religieuses envahirent les écoles sans avoir besoin d'un permis d'enseignement délivré par l'État. Leur formation pédagogique s'acquerrait dans les scolasticats de leurs communautés jusqu'en 1931 pour les frères et 1937 pour les religieuses. À partir de 1880, le nombre des enseignants laïcs décrut, les curés favorisant l'installation des enseignants congréganistes dans leur paroisse.

Les deux écoles normales catholiques d'État fondées en 1856 ne se multiplièrent pas au cours des cent années suivantes. Le gouvernement, pour des raisons d'économie, et l'Église québécoise, pour maintenir sous son influence directe la formation des futures institutrices, confièrent aux communautés religieuses féminines le soin d'ouvrir des écoles normales. La situation demeura inchangée jusqu'en 1969, alors que l'on confia à l'Université du Québec la mission de former les maîtres.

Les interlocuteurs français se sont préoccupés de comparer les manuels catholiques et laïcs en ce qui concerne la Révolution française et d'examiner la présence des femmes, au cours de cette même période, dans les manuels d'histoire.

Les manuels catholiques et laïcs de la troisième République ont donné une interprétation différente de la Marseillaise de Rouget de Lisle et des représentations de Marianne. Dès 1904, le tableau de Pils faisait appel à des commentaires d'une grande noblesse. L'oeuvre de Rude mettant en scène une femme qui hurle et qui brandit l'épée est préférée par les républicains progressistes. Les ouvrages laïcs de l'entre-deux-guerres placèrent côte à côte les deux représentations. L'inventaire des manuels catholiques de 1880 à 1914 ne relève qu'une seule reproduction du tableau de Pils. Cette absence presque totale d'images sur l'auteur de la Marseillaise marque la désapprobation de la funeste Révolution plutôt qu'un banal oubli. Dans les manuels catholiques, on ne trouve le haut-relief de Rude que comme un symbole de la Résistance française contre l'occupation nazie, après 1940.

Les volontaires de 1792 étaient expliqués de façon différente dans les manuels laïcs et catholiques, même s'ils utilisaient souvent la même imagerie. D'une part, les soldats sortant des rangs du peuple, enthousiastes et électrisés, marchaient à la victoire en chantant le nouvel hymne patriotique. D'autre part, ces mêmes volontaires, mal équipés, sans discipline et avides de pillage, restèrent à Paris pour aider à renverser la royauté. Voilà comment les mêmes éléments d'information ont fait l'objet de commentaires opposés à l'école laïque et à l'école catholique.

Quant à la représentation des femmes proposée dans les manuels d'histoire, on montre comment elles sont exclusivement rattachées aux tâches domestiques. Sur les images, on remarque au hasard une figure féminine anonyme. Peu de manuels évoquent la Déclaration des droits de la femme et de la citoyenne. Cette dernière fut exclue du droit de vote, la domination masculine limitant la volonté de réforme de la Constituante.

Ces regards croisés France-Québec sur 1789 enseigné et imaginé commémorent-ils la Révolution française? Du moins, ce fut l'occasion de juxtaposer des lectures commentées d'une suite de faits historiques dont le retentissement a traversé deux siècles. Points d'observation éloignés l'un de l'autre, produits de deux mondes dont les voies s'étaient déjà séparées en 1789, souvenirs romantiques d'une mère-patrie imaginée plutôt que connue, surprise de la redécouverte depuis 1960, voilà autant d'objets de commémoration qui ont suscité une curiosité mutuelle, soit celle de s'expliquer les uns aux autres ce qu'évoque le bicentenaire de la Révolution française.

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